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An Advocacy Model for Representation of
Low-Income Intervenors in State Public

Utility Proceedings
Stefan H. Krieger*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past sixteen years, the number of proceedings before state
public utility commissions has soared. Prior to the early 1970s, the
price of energy actually decreased,' and public utilities were involved
in few formal regulatory proceedings.2 In the early 1970s, however, this
situation changed radically as energy prices began to climb. The economies of scale and other technological advances, which had resulted in
lower electric prices after World War II, largely had been achieved. 3
At the same time, the rate of inflation skyrocketed, and interest rates

* B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., University of Illinois. Assistant Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University. I wish to thank those who have read and commented on this
manuscript, especially Roger Colton and Professor Richard Pierce. I also with to express my
gratitude to my research assistants, Leslie Stephan Vincze, Joseph Kolb, and Carla Jackson for
their help in preparation of this article.
1. Anderson, State Regulation of Electric Utilities, in THE POLITICS OF REOULATION 3, 1819 (J. Wilson ed. 1980) (from 1951 to 1971, the real price of energy fell 43 percent).
2. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Processof Public
Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291, 307 (1974). Joskow collected data concerning the
number of general rate of return reviews of private gas, electric, and combination gas and electric
utilities processed by state commissions between 1949 and 1972. He found two periods of rather
substantial regulatory activity of electric utilities (1949 to 1952 and 1969 to 1972); one period of
moderate activity (1957 to 1960); and the remaining years, especially 1962 to 1968, little formal
regulatory activity. Id. at 305-06. He found two periods of extensive rate of return review activity
of the gas industry (1957 to 1962 and 1968 to 1972). Id. at 306.
Although public utilities commissions often regulate other industries in addition to gas and
electric utilities, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY COMMIssoNERs, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT
ON UTILITY AND CARRIER REGULATION 754-56 (1988) (Table 165) [hereinafter NARUC REPORT],

this article focuses primarily on gas, electric, and telecommunication utilities. Most regulatory
activity that has a significant impact on low-income families arises in the context of those utilities.
3. D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC UTIxUIS 70 (1981); W. GORmiEY,
POLITICS OF PUBLIC

UTILITY REGULATION

8 (1983).
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climbed steeply. 4 Then, in October 1973, the country was hit by the
Arab oil embargo. In reaction to the embargo, electric utilities embarked
on new nuclear construction programs, and gas utilities sought alternative sources of fuel.5
As a result of rising fuel costs, utilities sought rate relief in formal
proceedings before public utility commissions. In 1963, nationwide,
commissions reviewed only three electric utility rate cases. By 1969, the
number had increased to nineteen, and by 1975, it had grown to 114.6
Nationally, electric rates rose ninety percent in the five years after
1970. 7 Unlike the sleepy days of the 1950s and 1960s, commission
review of rates became a continuing process, with utility requests for
interim rate relief (pending final rate orders), proposals for the use of
purchased gas and fuel adjustment clauses, and filings of new rate cases
immediately after termination of the previous cases.'

4. Joskow, supra note 2, at 312-13. With the rise in inflation and interest rates, utility
construction costs soared. From 1972 to 1975, for example, the cost per kilowatt of new nuclear
capacity rose 80%, and the cost of new coal-fired plants doubled. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3,
at 70. As a result of these increased costs, the standing of public utilities in the financial
community diminished. From 1974 through June 1977, Moody's and Standard and Poors made
184 changes in the ratings of electric utilities. While 35 issues were upgraded, 150 were downgraded.
Id. at 73.
5. See R. VnETOR, ENERGY Poucy IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 292-303 (1984).
6. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 70; see also D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, REGULATORY
POLICY AND PROCESSES: THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIssIONS IN TENNESSEE, KENTUCKY & GEORGIA'
105-06 (1980) (increase in rate proceedings in three states for period 1973 to 1977); Joskow, supra
note 2, at 305-07. Nationwide, in 1987, there were 168 electric utility rate cases and 125 gas utility
rate cases pending before state public utility commissions. See NARUC REPORT, supra note 2, at
322-41.
7. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 69. In some states, the increase was even greater. In New
York, for example, some consumers paid nearly twice as much per kilowatt-hour in 1974 as they
had in 1972. Id.
8. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 70-71; Joskow, supra note 2, at 315-16. Utilities also
sought to use future test years as a basis for proposed rate schedules to enlarge the amounts of
their rate increases. Id. at 316.
Interim rate relief, purchased gas and fuel adjustment clauses, and future test years are all used
by utilities to obtain rate relief that could not be acquired under the traditional ratemaking
process. Under standard procedures, a utility files proposed schedules for a rate increase, and the
commission suspends the increase (usually for a period of six to 12 months) pending the outcome
of formal evidentiary hearings. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 2/3, para. 9-201 (1987);
NARUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 763-66 (Table 167) (table of suspension limitations in each
state). Beginning in the early 1970s, however, utilities, concerned about the "regulatory lag"
between the filing for a rate increase and the final commission order, sought to obtain rate relief
without the necessity of the full hearing process.
Under interim rate increase procedures, a utility can rde for full rate relief but seek immediate
approval of a partial increase, usually subject to a refund at the end of the case. This allows
utilities to meet immediate revenue requirements pending the "permanent" order at the end of
the suspension period. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co., Application for A Proposed General
Increase for Electric Service, No. 59359 (Il1. Commerce Comm'n Feb. 14, 1975) (LEXIS, Utility
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Moreover, under public pressure caused by rate increases, commissions themselves began to institute proceedings to address problems
raised by the "energy crisis." In response to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), 9 commissions opened generic

library, AlIpuc file) (granting $113 million annualized interim rate increase when utility alleged
that "it ha[d] experienced a sharp decline in its earnings which must be arrested and reversed in.
order to provide investors with creditable assurance that it will strengthen its financial stature");
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 41 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 121, 126 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util.
1980) (granting interim relief and adopting liberalized interim relief standard "to combat -the
effects of regulatory lag on petitions for rate relief"); Detroit Edison Co., 47 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 363, 371, 383-84 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) (commission granted $145 million
interim rate increase, recognizing the magnitude of the utility's revenue deficiency and the
significant lag for the utility in obtaining final relief).
Purchased gas adjustment clauses (for gas companies) and fuel adjustment clauses (for electric
companies) allow utilities to adjust their rates automatically, whenever their fuel costs change,
without the necessity of a full rate hearing. See Uniform Fuel Adjustment Clauses, 45 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 5 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1981) (approving a uniform fuel adjustment clause
for state's electric utilities, holding that "[i]n a highly inflationary period, a comprehensive fuel
adjustment clause is essential"); Standard Purchased Gas Adjustment, 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 619, 622-24 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980). To avoid the requirements of the formal
ratemaking process, other utilities have sought commission approval for automatic adjustment
clauses for non-fuel costs. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 349 N.W.2d 539,
543-44 (1984) (affirming commission order affirming "indexing" of certain operation and maintenance expenses to the Consumer Price Index).
Although traditionally the method for deciding rate cases involves examining a utility's rate
base, expenses, and revenues based on a historic "test year," the use of a future "test year"
allows a utility to base its request for rate relief on estimated costs in the coming year. In an
inflationary period, use of a future test year allows the utility to enlarge its rate request
substantially. See Mohave Elec. Coop., 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 85, 88 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n
1982) (although previous practice was to use historic test year, commission used future test year
because otherwise utility would be seeking additional relief by the end of the year); Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 11 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 115, 121 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1975) (commission
using future test year because of inflationary conditions); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 46
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 63, 85-87 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982) (commission using future
test year because the company was "particularly susceptible to inflation and to high interest
rates").
9. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1988). PURPA required state commissions to make "determinations" whether or not to adopt certain ratemaking and regulatory standards for electric
utilities. See id. §§ 2621-2627. In response to PURPA, commissions opened rulemaking or
investigation cases, applicable to all electric utilities under their jurisdiction ("generic dockets"),
to decide whether or not to adopt the PURPA standards. See PURPA Rate Design Standards,
45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 24, 26-27 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Public Util. Regulatory
Policies Act Standards., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 39, 42 (Alaska Pub. Util. Comm'n 1981);
Generic Hearings Concerning Elec. Rate Structure, 36 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 6, 32-33 (Colo.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1979); Consideration of Lifeline Rates, 43 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 355,
355-56 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Peak-Load Pricing for Elec. Util., 36 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 413, 415-16, 419 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); Interruptible. Rate & Load Management Standards, 43 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 163, 166 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1981);
Time-of-day & Seasonal Elec. Rates, 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 494, 496-97 (Iowa State
Commerce Comm'n 1981); Lifeline Rates for Elec. Serv., 73 Md. P.S.C. 702 (Nov. 22, 1982)
(LEXIS, Utility library, Allpuc file); Proceedings to Consider Elec. Rate-making Standards., 35
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dockets to investigate various energy-related issues, including marginal
cost pricing methods, 0 declining block rates," peakload and time-ofday pricing, 2 and lifeline rates." In reaction to higher consumer bills,
many commissions instituted rulemaking proceedings to modify utility
credit and collection practices and to investigate utility-supported conservation programs.' 4 As utility nuclear construction programs bur-

Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339, 344 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); Department of Pub. Serv.,
37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 497, 514-15 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); Investigation Into
Rate Structures of Elec. Util., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 409, 410-11 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1980); Cost-of-service Rate-making Standards, 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 33, 45 (Tex. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981); Generic Investigation on the Comm'n's Own Motion, No. 05-UR-9, I-AC10, I-AC-14 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 3, 1981) (LEXIS, Utility library, Allpuc file).
Also, under the National Energy Conservation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206,
Congress required state commissions to adopt residential conservation plans consistent with certain
federal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 8201-8235i (1988). In response to this statute, commissions
opened generic residential conservation dockets. See, e.g., Residential Conservation Serv. Program,
42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 652, 653 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Residential Conservation
Serv. Program, 35 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 515, 534 (Conn. Div. Pub. Util. Control 1980).
10. Marginal cost pricing bases the cost of utility service on the avoidable cost the utility
must incur to produce one more unit of its product at a given level of output. See E. GELHORN
& R. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTrIES IN A NuTsHELL 195-96 (2d ed. 1987). "If the price of a
product is determined by its marginal cost," the theory goes, "consumers confront a price that
reflects the amount and value of the resources required to produce the last, or marginal, unit of
that product." Id. at 196.
Addressing the issue of marginal cost pricing, PURPA required state regulators to set "cost of
service" standards that took into account the extent to which total costs to an electric utility are
likely to change.if "additional capacity is added to meet peak demand relative to base demand."
16 U.S.C. § 2625(a)(2)(A) (1988).
11. Under a declining block rate structure, a utility charges less per unit of energy as
consumption increases. Under PURPA standards, declining block rates are prohibited "except to
the extent that [the] utility demonstrates that the costs to such utility of providing service to such
class, which costs are attributable to such energy component, decrease as such consumption
increases during such period." 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(2) (1988).
12. Peakload rates charge more to a class of customers for usage during seasons of the year
when the utility experiences high demand. E. GEaLLORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 10, at 221.
Under time-of-day rates, the price for usage varies depending on the time of the day when the
unit of service is provided. Id. at 226. PURPA standards strongly recommend both of these types
of rates. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(3), (4) (1988).
13. In the broadest sense of the term, "lifeline rates" are special low-cost rates established
for the purpose of protecting low-income or elderly consumers. See C. PHsILLPS, Tn REGOULAON
OF PUBLIC UTrnIs 398-401 (1984). There are two general approaches to establishing such rates:
(1) adoption of particular schedules allowing protected classes of customers to pay lower rates
than other similarly situated customers and (2) adoption of schedules that give all consumers a
reduced rate for a certain volume of usage (e.g., the first 200 to 500 kilowatt-hours of usage a
month). D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 146-47. The assumption underlying the second approach
is that most low-income or elderly customers are low-volume users of utility service. See id. at
147.
Under PURPA, state regulators are required to determine whether or not to adopt lower lifeline
rates for residential customers. 16 U.S.C. § 2624(b) (1988).
14. For examples of credit and collection cases, see generally Rules Governing Customer
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geoned, commissions began inquiries into the prudence of these programs
and their management. 5 And as large customers began to seek alternative sources of energy, proposals were presented to give companies
6
incentives to stay on the utility system.
In response to utility requests for rate increases and to the rise in
commission proceedings, consumer organizations sought to intervene in
these cases.' 7 Some groups developed from neighborhood and civic
organizations, many of whose members were low-income and whose
pocketbooks were directly affected by the rate increases." Other groups
addressed particular issues that they identified as important to the

Deposits of Elec. Utils., 6 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 151 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Service
Deposit & Termination Practices of Communication Util., 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 512
(Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1980); Late Payment Charges & Sec. Deposits, 69 Md. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 121 (1978) (LEXIS, Utility library, Ailpuc file). For examples of cases addressing
restrictions on disconnection of utility service, see generally Rules Regulating Serv. of Elec. Utils.,
35 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 365 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1980); Cold Weather Serv.
Termination Procedures, 52 Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 727 (1978) (LEXIS, Utility library, AtIpuc
file); Rules & Regulations Governing the Disconnection of Util. Serv., 2 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 209 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1973). For an example of a case concerning a utility-supported
conservation program, see generally Conservation Fin., 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 443 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) (requiring weatherization financing programs to benefit low-income
ratepayers). And for examples of cases addressing utility problems of the poor, see In re Regulations
Governing Termination of Gas or Elec. Serv. to Low-Income Residential Customers During the
Heating Season, 79 Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 83 (1988) (LEXIS, Utility library, Allpuc file); In
re Investigation of Gas & Elec. Serv. in Winter Emergencies, No. 83-303-GE-COI (Pub. Util.
Comm'n of Ohio Nov. 23, 1983) (LEXIS, Utility library, Allpuc file).
15. See, e.g., Nine Mile Point 2 Nuclear Generating Facility, 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
23, 25-27 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1986); Long Island Lighting Co., 71 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 262, 264-66 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1985); In re Investigation into the Perry Nuclear
Power Station, (1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, Ohpuc file).
16. See,- eg., Commonwealth Edison Co., 61 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 50-51 (Il1.
Commerce Comm'n 1984) (commission rejecting electric company's proposal for economic development rider as too speculative, but noting that it was not opposed to the concept of such a
rider); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 96 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 267, 268-70 (Ind. Util. Reg.
Comm'n 1988); Detroit Edison, 68 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 241, 283 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1985); Incentive Rates for Elec. Serv., 82 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 624, 625-26 (Or. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1987) (setting criteria for discounted rates); Narragansett Elec. Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 120, 128-34 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1983).
17. W. GOElmt~y, supra note 3, at 34; Anderson, supra note 1, at 23-24.
18. Gormley calls these groups "grassroots advocacy" groups, private organizations that
promote interests unrelated to the occupations of its members. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 43;
see also Gormley, Public Advocacy in Public Utility Commission Proceedings, 17 J. APPiED
BEHAVIORAL Sci. 446, 448 (1981). Gormley identifies four different types of grassroots advocacy
groups: 1) environmental groups (such as the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources
Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth), 2) antinuclear groups (such as the
Clamshell Alliance in New England), 3) consumer groups (such as the Illinois Public Action
Council and the Michigan Citizens Lobby), and 4) low-income groups (such as South Austin
.Coalition Community Council in Chicago and the New Jersey Federation of Senior Citizens). W.
GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 44-49 (table listing grassroots advocacy groups by category).
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collective good, for example, commission meetings open to the public. 9
Finally, state legislatures, attorneys general, and governors began to
develop offices of public counsel and to hire attorneys to intervene on
behalf of consumers in commission proceedings. 20
In the last two decades, much has been written supporting the rights
of citizen group intervenors in administrative proceedings, particularly
in public utility commission cases. Commentators stress the right of all
affected interests to participate in the administrative process and assert
that public participation helps to assure responsible decisionmaking and
public support for resulting policies. 2' They applaud the development

of liberalized standing rules for intervenors in administrative proceedings"2

19. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 448; see also J. BERRY, Loaavso FOR THE PEOPLE 7
(1977) (definition of public interest group as "one that seeks a collective good, the achievement
of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization").
20. W. GoRMLEY, supra note 3, at 50-53. Gormley calls these official intervenors "proxy
advocates"-"governmental organization[s] that [represent] all or most residents of a particular
jurisdiction before another governmental organization." Id. at 49. For a state-by-state listing of
proxy advocacy groups, see NARUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 846-48 (Table 193).
21. As Gellhorn noted:
There are a number of potential social advantages to public participation in
administrative hearings. Public intervention can provide agencies with another dimension useful in assuring responsive and responsible decisions; it can serve as a
safety valve allowing interested persons and groups to express their views before
policies are announced and implemented; it can ease the enforcement of administrative programs relying upon public cooperation; and it can satisfy judicial demands
that agencies observe the highest procedural standards.
Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 361 (1972); see
also Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participationin the Administrative
Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 529-30 (1972); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HAav. L. REv. 1669, 1712 (1975) ("Implicit in this development is the assumption that
there is no ascertainable, transcendent 'public interest,' but only the distinct interests of various
individuals and groups in society.").
Not all commentators accept this assumption: "[Tihe zeal of pluralism for the group and its
belief in a natural harmony of group competition tend[s] to break down the very ethic of
government by reducing the essential conception of government to nothing more than another set
of mere interest groups." T. Lows, TmE END OP L IBERALSM
48 (1969). "Interest-group liberalism
as public philosophy corruptsdemocratic government because it deranges and confuses expectations
about democratic institutions. ... It derogates from democratic rights ... by assuming they are
being exercised when access is provided." Id. at 288. Lowi concludes that liberal jurisprudence is
policy without law. Id. at 125-27.
This article does not enter the debate over the merits of interest-group liberalism. It takes the
pluralistic jurisprudence system as given and discusses the ways that lawyers can work within it
for the benefit of their clients.
22. See, e.g., Gelhorn, supra note 21, at 363-66. Gellhorn refers approvingly to the decision
in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966), in which the court held that parties with aesthetic, conservation, and
recreation interests had standing to seek judicial review of an agency order, and the opinion in
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and urge agencies to afford "public interest" intervenors full partici23
patory rights in agency proceedings.
Several writers have proposed methods for funding "public interest"
intervention in public utility commission proceedings. Some have recommended statutory authorization of the award of attorney's fees to
prevailing intervenors in these cases.2 Others have suggested legislative
2
support to fund intervenor advocates before public utility commissions.
And still others have proposed the establishment of publicly-funded
26
groups to represent the rights of consumers in public utility cases.

Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (D.C. Cir.
1965), in which the court held that the listening public's interest in programming content conferred
standing to intervene in an FCC case. Relying on these and similar cases, state commissions and
courts have adopted liberalized standing requirements for commission cases and for judicial review
of commission orders. See, e.g., In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 96 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d
(PUR) 373, 382-83 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972) (relying on United Church of Christ,
commission allowed intervention of consumer group); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Haw. 260,
265 n.1, 535 P.2d 1102, 1105-06 n.l (1975) (in allowing appeal of commission order by environmental group, the court noted, "the trend in American jurisprudence . . . has been to broaden
the class of persons that have standing to challenge agency action"); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 347 N.W.2d 423, 426-27 (Iowa 1984) (holding that
consumer organization had standing to seek judicial review of rate order); In re Green Mountain
Power Corp., 98 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 291, 293-95 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1973) (allowing
individual to intervene in commission proceeding on his own behalf, but not on behalf of a class
of all customers, because he did not sufficiently specify issues he would raise, as had the intervenor
in Scenic Hudson).
23. Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 383-88.
24. Cf. id. at 395-97 (proposing awards of fees to prevailing parties in federal administrative
cases). Although a few courts and commissions have held that public utility commissions have
inherent authority to award attorney's fees and expert witness expenses to prevailing intervenors,
see Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 195 Colo. 130, 133-36, 576 P.2d
544, 546-48 (1978) (holding that constitutionally-created commission has inherent authority to
award attorney's fees and witness expenses to intervenor municipal league); Wisconsin's Envtl.
Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 320, 322 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. 1982) (holding that commission had implied authority to award expert witness fees), the
prevailing view is that commissions have no such power. See Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 744, 750, 639 P.2d 442, 448 (1981) (holding that even though PURPA
provides for awards of fees in proceedings under the act, commission cannot award fees if
legislature has not explicitly given it such authority); cf. Senior Citizens Coalition v. Minnesota
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 355 N.W.2d 295, 301-04 (Minn. 1984) (holding that even if commission had
inherent authority to award fees, it could not exercise that authority without adoption of rules
by commission).
25. W. GORMIY, supra note 3, at 187-88. For an example of an intervenor funding program,
see MICH. Comp. LAWs ANN. §§ 460.6-1 to 460.6m (West Supp. 1989) (creation of utility consumer
representation fund, financed by utilities).
26. W. GoasLEY, supra note 3, at 186-87 (proposal for establishment of Citizens Utility
Board); Leflar & Rogol, Consumer Participation in the Regulation of Public Utilities: A Model
Act, 13 HAzv. J. ON LEoIS. 235, 266-97 (1976) (model statute for establishing the Residential
Utility Consumer Action Group); cf. Bonfield, Representationfor the Poor in FederalRulemaking,
67 MICH. L. REv. 511, 530 (1969) (proposing the creation of an office of independent poor
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Although the literature is replete with calls for the expansion of
intervenor rights and increased intervenor funding, little examination
has been made of the quality of advocacy by intervenor groups. The
focus has been solely on the procedural rights of intervenors, 27 models
for formalizing representation of "consumer" interests in commission
proceedings, 2 and methods for funding attorney and expert witness
support in these cases. 29 While there is some evidence of a correlation
between participation by citizens' groups in public utility commission
proceedings and the size of residential electric and gas rates,30 little is
known about the relative effectiveness of different methods of consumer
representation. 3' As Ethridge notes, "a common conclusion [of the
literature] is that procedures designed to encourage citizen involvement
lead to more effective and aggressive policy implementation .... However, these beliefs may be based more on normative preferences for
democratic forms or vague expectations than on empirical evidence.' '32
Little study has been made of the effectiveness of consumer intervenor
groups in commission cases for several reasons. First, because many of
these groups lack systems of accountability, the staff and attorneys for
these organizations have little incentive to reflect on the quality of
representation. Many "public interest" attorneys are not responsible to
any definable constituency and exercise broad discretion in defining
their clients' interests and the mode of representation." These attorneys
have less motivation to evaluate their advocacy methods than a lawyer
representing an individual client or for-profit corporation. Second, many
of these organizations have rationalized ineffective advocacy as the
result of a system which cannot be beaten. Because the utilities have

peoples' counsel in federal administrative cases); Gelihorn, supra note 21, at 397. For examples
of Citizens Utility Boards ("CUBs"), see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 901-21 (Smith-Hurd
1988 & Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 774.010-774.990 (1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.01199.18 (West Supp. 1989). CUBs are funded by voluntary ratepayer contributions and are operated
by boards elected by the contributors.
27. See generally Cramton, supra note 21; Gellhorn, supra note 21.
28. W. GoRaMEY, supra note 3, at 182-88.
29. Id.
* 30. Gormley, Nonelectoral Participation as a Response to Issue-Specific Conditions: The Case
of Public Utility Regulation, 62 Soc. Sm. Q. 527, 532 (1981).
31. R. Mayer, J. Burton & C. Zick, Consumer Representation and Local Telephone Rates 2
(June 1988) (presented at the 34th Conference of American Council on Consumer Interest)
[hereinafter Mayer].
32. Ethridge, The Policy Impact of Citizen Participation Procedures: A Comparative State
Study, 10 AM. PoL. Q. 489, 491-92 (1982).
33. Leflar & Rogol, supra note 26, at 247; see W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 37-38; Gormley,
Statewide Remedies for Public Underrepresentation in Regulatory Proceedings, 41 Pun. ADMIN.
REV. 454, 457-58 (1981); Stewart, supra note 21, at 1765-67.
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all the resources and high-powered attorneys, the argument goes, even
partial victories are triumphs.3 4 Third, many advocates, especially in
the 1970s, focused their attention on formal procedural reforms in the
agency." They concerned themselves with traditional doctrines of due
process, often without evaluating the real impact of these issues on
36
utility performance.
Finally, there is a bias in the traditional law review and social science
literature against discussions of practice and advocacy skills. While
there is abundant examination of intervenor rights in public utility
commission proceedings and methods for funding consumer representation in these cases, the commentators are virtually silent on the subject
of what constitutes quality advocacy once the intervenor is allowed
through the commission's door.3 7
Implicit in the existing literature is the assumption that, once intervenor groups have the necessary financial and professional resources,
they will be well represented, or at least as well represented as most
clients. Commentators presume that lawyers know what to do once
they have the necessary resources. Armed with their legal research skills
and their expert witnesses, the argument goes, the same trial advocacy
skills used in court cases can be applied in public utility commission
proceedings.
The problem with this assumption is that commission proceedings
are quite different from most court cases. Most court cases concern
the applicability of substantive law to "historical facts." 38 Most com-

34.

Cf. J. CHUBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: THE POLITICS OF ENERGY

111

(1983) (quoting a lawyer for an environmentalist group in regard to Nuclear Regulatory Commission
proceedings: "You can't be successful at a regulatory agency unless you have the financial
resources to sue their asses off."). This reaction to administrative proceedings is similar to the
response of lobbyists to defeats in the legislative setting. See J. BERRY, supra note 19, at 275-78
(quoting public interest lobbyist: "I've always believed that public interest lobbying is a very
ineffective thing. You can't point to something and say 'we did that.' But if you didn't do the
work, it would be so much the worse.").
35. For examples of advocates who focused primarily on procedural issues, see generally
COMMON CAUSE,

MONEY,

SECRECY AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION (1976) and Levin, Illinois

Public Utility Law and the Consumer: A Proposal To Redress the Imbalance, 26 DE PAUL L.
REV. 259 (1977).
36. In the long run, however, a lawyer's success in obtaining procedural reforms may not
necessarily mean getting what her client wants. See Stewart, supra note 21, at 1777-81. On remand
from a court, the agency can remedy the procedural defects but keep the same substantive holding.
37. But see generally DeLong, How to Convince An Agency: A Handbook for Policy
Advocates, 6 REG. 27 (Sept.-Oct. 1982) (describing helpful techniques for advocacy before
regulatory bodies).
38.

D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN,

FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS To PROOF 4 (1984).

Binder and Bergman distinguish between three categories of fact-finding: 1) "historical factfinding," which involves the factfinder's determination about what happened in the past; 2)
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mission cases, on the other hand, do not focus merely on evidence of
specific events. Rather, "[s]ubstantive issues are at stake which embody
highly controversial political and social values." 3 9 Commission decisionmaking is an inherently political process in which commissioners must
choose between demands of conflicting interest groups. 40 Issues such as
rate of return, rate design, allocation of costs of cancelled nuclear
plants, low-income payment plans, and .economic incentive rates, by
their very nature require balancing of different political, social, and
economic interests. 4' A commission's "findings of fact" in a case may
be merely hooks upon which the commission can hang its policy
decision. 42
Because proceedings in public utility commissions are essentially
political in nature, traditional methods of trial advocacy are not always
applicable and may even be harmful. 43 There is more to a commission

"normative fact-finding," which involves the factfinder's evaluation of what happened according
to his or her perception of a community standard of reasonableness; and 3) "legislative factfinding," which involves the factfinder's decision that a change in substantive law will or will not
have certain social consequences. Id. at 4-8. In the public utility regulatory context, some decisions
concern "normative facts" (e.g., reasonableness of rate of return) and most major decisions
involve "legislative facts" (e.g., decisions about the economic, social, and political consequences
of the cancellation of a nuclear plant). Very few decisions concern solely "historical facts." In
the area of advocacy on behalf of low-income clients, the best example of a "historical fact"
case is a complaint case raising the issue of whether notice was given to a customer before
disconnection of utility service.
39. Nelkin & Pollak, Public Participation in Technological Decisions: Reality or Grand
Illusion?, 81 TECH. REV., Aug.-Sept. 1979, at 54, 64.
40. Primeaux & Mann, Regulator Selection Methods and Electricity Prices, 62 LAND EcoN.
1, 12 (1986). Although commissions were created to take regulation out of politics, "[rlegulation
is and always will be an intensely political process." M. BERNsTn, REGULATING BusINEss nY
INDEPENDENT CommIsIoN 73, 183 (1955).
Recent studies have shown that public utility commission decisions are based in large part on
policy considerations, rather than the mere application of established legal doctrine to an
evidentiary record. See Joskow, supra note 2, at 312-25; Leflar & Rogol, supra note 26, at 251
("Decisions of utility commissions are based on considerations of the interests of the parties
before it, not on mechanical formulas dictated by the data presented to it."); Pelsoci, Organizational Correlates of Utility Rates, in ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: THE MAKING AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 101, 113 (M. Steinman ed. 1979).
41. Bernstein has noted that the "American regulatory experience has been accompanied by
a naive view of the political process." M. BERNsTEIN, supra note 40, at 128. While politics is
seen as something to be avoided, it is inevitable when a commission is addressing matters of
social and economic consequence. See id. at 129 ("The genius of democracy is in politics, not in
sterilization of politics.").
42. As Joskow, for example, found in his longitudinal study of rate of return regulation in
state public utility commissions, "[t~he essence of public utility price regulation is not the rate of
return constraint. The rate of return aspect of regulation is merely a method by which a regulatory
commission justifies its approval of price increases or major changes in rate structures." Joskow,
supra note 2, at 325.
43. "[Tlhe principles of legal advocacy are only partially applicable to policy advocacy, and
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proceeding than the presentation of a prima facie case on the elements
of a cause of action and a persuasive factual theory of the case. The
advocate must also address the economic, social, political, and institutional concerns of the commission. Otherwise, a beautifully crafted
legal argument may have no effect whatsoever.
The purpose of this article is to analyze how the political system of
public utility regulation operates and to develop a model of advocacy
for quality representation of low-income consumer groups in these
proceedings." My focus will not be on specific techniques for persuading
regulators in particular situations, 45 but rather will be on analytic
.methods for planning a persuasive presentation to a commission.
My model is based on political science studies describing the decisionmaking process in public utility commissions. After reviewing the political science literature concerning theories of regulation, I will examine
particular empirical studies of the public utility regulatory process.
Based on those studies, I will develop a model for preparation of a
public utility commission case. Specifically, I will recommend that an
attorney in such a proceeding should consider four factors in planning
her case:
1) the
2) the
3) the
4) the

composition of the commission audience;
capabilities of her client;
configuration of the regulatory environment; and
nature of the issues in a particular case.

This article develops a framework for case planning; it does not craft
a trial plan for every possible public utility commission case. It is
impossible to predict with certainty how a particular commission is
going to rule in a specific case. Even within the same commission,
there may be differences from one regulatory context to another or in
the commission's treatment of one utility compared to another.4 Be-

in places where they are not applicable they can be misleading and downright harmful." DeLong,
supra note 37, at 27.
44. 1 have taken the approach recently followed by other commentators in the trial advocacy
area who have shifted from merely "how to" literature for the performance of discrete trial skills
to the development of models for approaching the litigation process. See generally G. BELLOW &
B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY
(1978); P. BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL (1979); D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, supra
note 38. Bergman, for example, has developed a credibility model that an attorney can use in
planning her entire case: voir dire, opening statement, direct examination, cross examination, and
closing argument. P. BERGMAN, supra, at 30-57.
45. See DeLong, supra note 37, for an example of a "how-to" approach to advocacy before
regulatory commissions.
46. See D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 69.
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cause the focus of this article is on general methods for preparing a
case, an attorney will have to adapt this model to the particular
circumstances of a case.
This article does not attempt to minimize the need for financial and
expert resources by consumer intervenors in commission cases. Such7
4
intervenors naturally are constrained by the limits of their resources.
Utilities and many industrial and commercial intervenors have substantially greater funding sources than consumer groups. At the same time,
however, many consumer groups enter public utility proceedings with
no long-term plans but merely "gut" feelings that they are being
"ripped off."'
The purpose of this article is to assist these groups by.
suggesting means to make the best possible use of limited resources.
For a number of reasons, I have chosen to concentrate on issues
faced by lawyers for low-income consumer groups. Although high
energy costs affect all utility customer classes, they especially impact
the poor. Although the poor generally consume less energy than other
utility customers, they spend a larger percentage of their budgets on
energy bills. 49 At the same time, they face substantial obstacles to their
participation in the regulatory process. While all consumer intervenors
encounter financial barriers in utility proceedings, 0 low-income intervenors must overcome severe funding constraints. Many governmentfunded attorneys who represent consumers in commission proceedings 5
have large budgets and staffs. 2 Most low-income advocates, however,
lack financial and expert resources." 'Moreover, in the last eight years,

47. Proceedings before public utility commissions can be quite costly affairs. Over a decade
ago, Leflar and Rogol estimated that a full-fledged contest to a major rate increase could cost as
much as $100,000 for expert witnesses, attorney's fees, and transcripts. Leflar & Rogol, supra
note 26, at 246; cf. Cramton, supra note 21, at 538-41 (addressing the problems of cost in federal
administrative cases); Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 389-98 (same); Stewart, supra note 21, at 1764
(same).
48. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 149; infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
49. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 13; NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, ENERGY AND THE
POOR-THE FORGOTTEN CRISIS 1 (1989) (low-income households on average expend II% of their
household income on home energy, three to four times the percent for the typical American
household); see also Berry, Utility Regulation in the States: The Policy Effects of Professionalism
and Salience to the Consumer, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 263, 267-68 (1979).
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51. Gormley refers to these intervenors as "proxy advocates." W. GORMLEY, supra note 3,
at 49-53.
52. Gormley, supra note 33, at 458-59.
53. Gormley, supra note 18, at 448-49. Many citizen groups active in public utility commission
proceedings have annual budgets of $20,000 or less. Gormley, supra note 33, at 458. Many of
these organizations are involved with other issues besides public utility matters (e.g., housing
rehabilitation, crime, and neighborhood services) and cannot commit their entire budget to utility
issues.
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the Legal Services Corporation's ("L.S.C.") restrictions on representation of community organizations and advocacy before administrative
bodies have limited the abilities of legal services attorneys to represent
54
low-income intervenors adequately in commission proceedings.
Given these constraints on lawyers for low-income intervenors, a
model of advocacy for these attorneys is especially useful. Many of
these attorneys merely fly by the seat of their pants in commission
proceedings, with no consideration of long-term planning or sirategy.
As a result, many regulators consider low-income advocates "ill-informed, irresponsible, and obstructionist."15 Hopefully, this model will
assist lawyers and other advocates for low-income intervenors with
limited resources in their choice of issues, development of strategies,
56
and overall planning in public utility commission proceedings.
II.

THEoRIEs

OF REGULATION

The underlying premise for this article is that a lawyer must understand the decision-making process of a particular forum in order to
prepare her case adequately. The basis for the proposed advocacy model
is a description of the decision-making process in public utility commissions. This description is founded on various theories of the regulatory process developed by political scientists and economists and on
empirical studies of that process.
A.

Capture Model

Stated simply, the capture model of the regulatory process focuses
on the domination of the regulatory process by the regulated industries."
There are really two variants of the capture model: the "natural life
cycle" version, which uses the analogy of youth and old age to describe

54. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.5(c) (1989) (providing that L.S.C. recipients may represent an
organization or association only if it is "primarily composed of persons eligible for legal assistance
under the [Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974] and if it provides information showing that
it lacks, and has no practical means of obtaining, funds to retain private counsel"); id. § 1612.5(b)
(restricting administrative advocacy by L.S.C. recipients in rulemaking proceedings to "a particular
application, claim or case directly involving the client's legal rights or responsibilities").
55. Gormley, supra note 18, at 449.
56. More effective advocacy on behalf of low-income groups will not only help indigent
individuals but also will be beneficial to the community at large. As Bonfield has noted, "[t]he
administration of government undoubtedly suffers as a whole from the inability of the economically
underprivileged segment of our society to represent adequately its group interests in the rulemaking
process." Bonfield, supra note 26, at 512.
57. Gormley, Alternative Models of the Regulatory Process: Public Utility Regulation in the
States, 35 W. POL. Q. 297, 297-98 (1982).
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the gradual takeover of agencies by the companies they regulate; and
the "economic" version, which stresses the economic inevitability that
these companies will dominate the regulators.
The "natural life cycle" variant was set forth by Marvin Bernstein
in his classic study, Regulating Business by Independent Commission.58
In that work, Bernstein reviewed the history of several federal regulatory
agencies and concluded that agencies pass through four phases of
existence on their way to domination by the regulated companies.
During phase one, "gestation," an activist public lobbies the legislature
for many years for the creation of a commission to reform a certain
industry. Because of the long struggle to get the statute adopted, it is
usually obsolete by the time it is passed.5 9 In phase two, "youth," the
commission still feels the political pressures that brought it into existence
and attempts to bring about reforms. But the public and the legislature
lose interest in the commission, tiring after the long struggle to get the
statute passed and assuming that the creation of the agency, by itself,
is all that is needed. 6° At the same time, the regulated industries test
the commission's powers in court, and the commission begins to operate
in a technical environment, outside the public's purview. As Bernstein
notes, a subtle relationship develops between the 'egulated and the
regulator, "in which the mores, attitudes, and thinking of those regulated come to prevail in the approach and thinking of many commis-

sioners. "61
Phase three, "maturity," is the process of devitalization. During this
period, the commission attempts to adjust to conflicts among the parties
by becoming less of a policeman and more of a manager. The commission becomes highly judicialized and eventually surrenders to the
regulated companies. 62 Finally, in phase four, "old age," the commission becomes totally passive and looks for safety in all its decisions. It
expects that it will be blamed if any company goes under, and its chief

58. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 74-102.
59. Id. at 74-77.
60. Id. at 79-84. According to capture theorists, capture is a direct result of the independence
of regulatory commissions. Because the chief executive lacks authority over regulatory commissions,
she quickly loses interest in them. Without her leadership, the legislative branch also loses interest.
W. GoRmi Y, supra note 3, at 134.
61. M. BEmRNTEm, supra note 40, at 83.
62. Id. at 86-90. As agencies mature, an imbalance develops in the representation process:
The regulated companies have information that the staff and the commission can rely on, and
agency resources are limited. Over an extended period of time, agencies begin to view the industries
as helpful in accomplishing their mission. On the other hand, opposing groups are diffuse, have
small individual stakes in the outcome of the case, and cannot provide the commission with
needed information. See Stewart, supra note 21, at 1713-14.
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63
goal becomes the maintenance of the status quo in the industry.
The "economic" school of capture theorists views regulation as being
"purchased" by the industry primarily for its own advantage.6 Under
the cruder version of this theory, professional employment interests
give regulators the economic incentive to rule in favor of industry
interests. Regulators are overly sympathetic to the regulated industries,
either because they previously worked for the companies or because
they hope for future employment at the end of their tenures at the
6
agency. s
The more sophisticated version of this theory maintains that industry
is able to control the regulatory process because the voting public is
usually uninformed as to specific regulatory issues and is generally not
organized to present unified policy preferences to its representatives.
The regulated companies, on the other hand, are well-organized and
have well-defined political interests. Accordingly, they buy power from
political parties that have votes and financial resources. 66 Rationally
self-interested government officials strive to maximize their votes and
wealth and adopt policies consistent with the interests of the regulated
companies. 67
Both versions of the capture theory have been challenged on a number
of grounds. Commentators have attacked the "natural life cycle" theory
as inconsistent with historic fact and empirical evidence. They have
shown that, contrary to the assertions of the life cycle theorists, some
regulatory agencies were in fact created with the support of the regulated
industries, not after heated political battles between reformers and the
industry. 68 They also have demonstrated that, in certain regulatory
contexts, agency officials have had the power to halt their agencies'
capture.69 And finally, they have described in detail how, inconsistent

63.
64.
65.

M. BERNSTErN, supra note 40, at 91-95.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 3 (1971).
For a review of the studies of the "revolving door" phenomenon in the federal context,
see P. QunK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 143-45 (1981).
66. Stigler, supra note 64, at 11-12.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Anderson, supra note 1, at 4-16. Anderson shows that activist reformers were not the
only motivating force behind state regulation of the electric industry. In fact, leaders in that
industry supported such regulation as an alternative to municipal ownership of electric utilities.
See also Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLmics OF REGULATION, supra note 1, at
357, 365 (In summarizing studies of various state and federal agencies, the author concludes,
"[w]hat is striking about the origins of the regulatory programs studied in this book is that in
almost every case, the initial law was supported by a rather broadly based coalition. Sometimes
industry was eagerly and happily part of the coalition.").
69. See Plumlee & Meir, Capture and Rigidity in Regulatory Administration: An Empirical

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

with the life cycle theory, agencies in their "mature phase" have adopted
policies that are not beneficial to the regulated industries. 70 These
commentators conclude that patterns of agency behavior are more
flexible, varied, and complex than the life cycle theorists suggest.
Although the life cycle model remains a useful conceptual and pedagogical metaphor, it falls short as an historical predictor of actual
7
agency behavior. '

Similarly, other studies have challenged the "economic" capture
theory.7 2 Anderson, for example, questions the focus on the control of
regulators by political parties in light of the contemporary decline of
the political party and the rise of entrepreneurial politics.

73

While

conceding that regulators have their own personal interests, Wilson
argues that the economic capture theory disregards three important
differences between politics and economics. First, politics concerns
preferences that do not always have a common monetary measuring
rod. In the political arena, unlike the marketplace, it is not always
possible to put a monetary value on competing preferences. Second,
political action requires assembling majority coalitions to make decisions
that bind everyone-whether or not they are members of the coalition.
Third, whereas economics is based on the assumption that preferences
74
are given, politics must take into account efforts to change preferences.
Given these differences, a number of commentators conclude that
the marketplace analogy of the capture theorists is too simplistic to
describe completely the regulatory process.
B.

Non-Capture Models

Recognizing the limitations of the capture theory, political scientists
have developed other theories to describe the regulatory process. The
major alternative theory is the interest group or pluralist model. This

Assessment, in Tam Poucy CYCLE 215, 216, 222-23 (J.May & A. Wildavsky eds. 1978) (describing
the development of the CAB, FCC, FPC, NLRB, FAA, OSHA and the Packers and Stockyards
Administration); see generally Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a
More Adequate-and Less Pessimistic-Theory of "Clientele Capture," 6 POL'Y Sci. 301 (1975)
(study of National Air Pollution Control Administration and Chicago Clean Air Coordinating
Committee showing that officials can halt the decay in constituency support for aggressive
regulation and that decline of a supportive constituency is not inevitable).
70. 'D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 7-8, 168-70.
71. Plumlee & Meir, supra note 69, at 231.
72. For a study challenging the "revolving door" capture theory-that regulators have an
incentive to decide in favor of industry because of past employment or possibility of future work
with the industry-see P. QuIRu,
supra note 65, at 143-74.
73. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 177-78.
74. Wilson, supra note 68, at 361-63.

22:639]

INTER VENORS IN UTILITY PROCEEDINGS

655

model views regulatory agencies as the targets of competing pressure
groups that have conflicting objectives and demands. 71 Under this
theory, policy change is seen as the product of a power struggle between
groups with different resources and interests. A variant of this theory
is the surrogate representation model, which views regulatory agencies
as the targets of professional reformers who champion underrepresented76
interests from a government niche outside of the regulatory agency.
These "proxy advocates" attempt to provide agencies with views other
than those of the regulated industry.
The major problem with the interest group model is that, while it
may describe political activity in a given agency, it does not provide
an explanation for the relative influence or lack of influence of each
interest group in the decision-making process. 77 As Gormley argues in
his description of the public utility regulatory process, "[t]he interest
group model errs by blurring the distinction between activity and
influence. Grassroots activists ... [in public utility proceedings) are
more active than effective .... In public utility regulatory policy, the
central problem facing grassroots advocates is not a lack of incentives
'7 8
but a lack of resources."
Another model of the regulatory process highlights the role of the
bureaucracy in the regulatory process. Proponents of this "organizational model" criticize the capture and pluralist theorists for ignoring
the role of agency staff in educating and influencing regulators. 79 In
the public utility commission context, these theorists point to regulator
reliance on staff in considering accounting, economics, finance, engineering, and legal issues. The influence of a powerful company or of
intervenor groups, they argue, may be offset by strong staff positions.

75. W. Goo.EY, supra note 3, at 134. Interest groups develop when both costs and benefits
of a proposed regulatory policy are narrowly concentrated. When costs and benefits are widely
distributed, "[i]nterest groups have little incentive to form around such issues because no small,
definable segment of society .. .can expect to capture a disproportionate share of the benefits
or avoid a disproportionate share of the burdens." Wilson, supra note 68, at 367.
76. W. Goutay, supra note 3, at 135.
77. Much of the jurisprudence providing for expansion of procedural rights in the regulatory
setting is based on an interest group model of regulation. See Stewart, supra note 21, at 1712,
1716. Just giving groups access to the regulatory process, however, does not mean that they will
be effective and have influence.
78. W. GoaioEy, supra note 3, at 149. "The capture model, in contrast, errs by blurring
the distinction between influence and control. Utility companies are very influential, but they do
not control the public utility regulatory process." Id.
79. Id. at 134-35; Gormley, supra note 57, at 299, 302; Sabatier & Pelkey, Incorporating
Multiple Actors and Guidance Instruments into Models of Regulatory Policymaking: An Advocacy
Coalition Framework, 19 ADmiN. & Soc. 236, 240 (1987).
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Still another proposed theory is the "sovereign overseer" model. This
model focuses on the ability of the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches to influence policy through control of legal authority, budget,
and political appointees.8 0 Under this theory, the interaction of regulators with the other branches of government is the field of political
battle.
C.

Multi-Variant Model

These traditional models of regulation have several limitations. First,
all these models tend to emphasize -the importance of a single type of
actor in the regulatory process-the industry, the intervenor groups,
the bureaucracy-rather than focus on the interaction of the different
actors. 8' Second, the models neglect the importance of the wider socioeconomic environment in which regulators operate. 2 Third, the models
fail to address the efficacy of various legal and political mechanisms
that are used by the various players in the regulatory process. 8 Finally,
the models do not take into account the regulators' professional values
and the agency's own bureaucratic norms.84'
Given the limitations of traditional regulatory models, several commentators have suggested the use of a "multi-variant" model, which
takes into account the interaction of the various players in the regulatory
process, the regulators' and bureaucracy's own interests, the regulatory
environment, and the different legal and political methods available to
participants in the process. 85 This article adopts such an approach,
recognizing the importance of all the players in public utility commission
proceedings: public utilities, intervenors, regulators, and staff. It also
will consider other influences in the regulatory environment: the technological and economic setting; the influence of the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities in the state; and the regulatory history in
the state. Finally, this article will examine the various political and
legal tools available to players in the process and explain how an
advocate can use these tools in developing a strategy.

III.

AN ADVOCACY MODEL

In the past decade, political scientists and economists have conducted
a number of empirical studies of the public utility decision-making

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Sabatier & Pelkey, supra note 79, at 239.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id.
See Gormley, Regulatory Issue Networks in a FederalSystem, 18 PoLITY 595, 597 (1986).
Gormley, supra note 57, at 315; Sabatier & Pelkey, supra note 79, at 237.
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process. 86 The findings of these studies clearly support a multi-variant

86. This research includes case studies, field studies, and statistical correlation research
examining the regulatory process in commissions. The model proposed in this article is based on
these studies.
The case study approach has been used by Douglas Anderson in describing the decision-making
process in the public utility commission setting. In two works, D. ANDERSON, supra note 3 and
Anderson, supra note 1, at 26-41, he describes the process in the mid-1970s that led to the
approval of lifeline rates in California and the adoption of marginal cost pricing by Alfred Kahn's
New York Public Service Commission. Anderson contrasts the political organizing methods used
by community groups to obtain lifeline rates in California with the professional values approach
used by Kahn to secure the support of commission staff in New York. D. ANDERSON, supra note
3, at 167-77. For a description of these two types of ratemaking, see supra notes 10 and 13.
Several political scientists also have conducted field studies of different state public utility
commissions. William Gormley, Jr. has undertaken the most extensive studies of this nature. In
PoLiTics OF PuBLic UTSLrrY REOULATION, supra note 3, and related articles; Gormley, The
Representation Revolution: Reforming State Regulation Through Public Representation, 18 ADnmm.
& Soc'y 179 (1986) [hereinafter, Gormley, The Representation Revolution]; Gormley, supra note
84; Gormley, Policy, Politics and Public Utility Regulation, 27 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 86 (1983)
[hereinafter Gormley, Policy and Politics]; Gormley, supra note 57; Gormley, supra note 30;
Gormley, supra note 33; Gormley, supra note 18, has presented his findings of a questionnaire
survey of commissioners from all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as in-depth
surveys and interviews of commissioners, staff members, utility representatives, and intervenors
in 12 states (California, Illinois, Wisconsin, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Wyoming). In evaluating these findings, Gormley
used three methods: 1) the "concurrence method," analyzing the extent of concurrence between
commissioners, staff, grassroots advocates, and proxy advocates on issue priorities, value priorities,
and policy preferences, W. GoRmiY, supra note 3, at 102-31; 2) the "perceptual method,"
examining the different parties' assessment of their respective influence in the regulatory process,
id. at 132-51; 3) and the "behavioral method," analyzing the relationship between the extent of
political activity in a state and regulatory behavior, id. at 152-77.
A number of similar field studies-although not on the scale of Gormley's-have been undertaken in different states. Weschler and Backoff examined findings of a 1983 to 1984 study of
Ohio state agencies, including the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. See generally Wechsler &
Backoff, Policy Making and Administration in State Agencies: Strategic Management Approaches,
46 PUB. ADmN. REV. 321 (1986). That study, based on intensive, unstructured interviews with
agency members, staff, and the different constituencies involved in the regulatory process, focused
on the relative influence of the different players in the process. Mitnick also has reviewed a 1977
study concerning the employment backgrounds of commissioners in different states. See generally
B. MrTNcK, THE PouncA EcoNomY Or REGULATION (1980). And Welborn and Brown have
presented their survey based on field interviews with commissioners, key staff personnel, utility
representatives, and intervenors in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia. See generally D. WELBORN
& A. BRowN, supra note 6.
A final group of studies of state public utility commissions involves statistical correlation
analyses, examining the effect of regulatory environment and commission composition on utility
rates. The classic study in this area is Joskow's research on the effect of inflationary conditions
and environmental concerns on utility rate of returns. See generally Joskow, supra note 2.
Hagerman and Ratchford conducted a similar study examining the effect of different economic
and political variables on electric utility rates of return. See generally Hagerman & Ratchford,
Some Determinants of Allowed Rates of Return on Equity to Electric Utilities, 9 BELL J. ECON.
46 (1978). Pelsoci has examined the correlation between different types of commissions and the
average price of electricity charged to residential consumers. Pelsoci, supra note.40, at 101. Berry
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theory of regulation. They show that differences in commission members, commission staff, intervenor groups, regulatory environment, and
issue context all affect the outcome of a public utility commission
proceeding. 7 The purpose of my advocacy model is to help the attorneys
for low-income intervenors in their consideration of these different
factors in the preparation of a case. These are:
A.

The Audience
1. Individual Staff and Commission Members
2. The Bureaucracy
3. Interactions of Commission Personnel
B. The Client
1. Ability To Monitor Commission Activities
2. Ability To Provide Expert Intervention
3. Ability To Mobilize Political Pressure
C. Configuration of the Regulatory Environment
1. Regulatory History and Political Culture
2. Economic and Technological Environment
3. Regulatory Community
a. Utilities
b. Other Intervenors
c. Other Government Bodies
4. Implications of the Regulatory Environment
D. The Issues
1. Salience and Complexity
2. Time Dimension of Regulatory Issues
3. Implications of Issue Context

has analyzed the relationship of commission professionalism and consumer intervention to electric
utility rate structure. Berry, supra note 49, at 101. And in the area of telephone regulation, Mayer
and his colleagues have analyzed the effects of commission composition and different types of
consumer advocacy on telephones rates. See generally Mayer, supra note 31.
In addition to these studies directly related to the public utility area, I have also examined
research on the regulatory process in other subject matter areas in the development of my advocacy
model. The major works on which I rely are Wilson's analysis of the politics of regulation in
both state and federal agencies, see generally Wilson, supra note 68; Quirk's examination of
industry influence in four federal agencies, see generally P. QURK, supra note 65; and Sabatier's
theories of regulatory decision-making, see generally Sabatier & Pelkey, supra note 79; Sabatier,
Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning and Policy Change, 8 KNoWLEDGE 649 (1987); Sabatier,
supra note 69. Although these studies concern agencies which regulate companies that are not
public utilities and that may operate in a different political context, they provide useful models
for examination of advocacy before any regulatory body.
87. These findings are also applicable to other areas of consumer protection regulation. See
Meier, The Political Economy of Consumer Protection Legislation: -An Examination of State
Legislation, 40 W. POL. Q. 343, 344-48 (1987).
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The Audience

In any type of advocacy, the lawyer, of course, must know her
audience.18 The advocate before a public utility commission faces an
especially complex job in framing arguments for an audience. First,
the particular audience within the commission may vary over a period
of time. For a day-to-day routine commission activity, the lawyer's
audience most likely will be low-level staff members; in formal hearings,
the audience probably will be more senior staff members and hearing
examiners or administrative law judges; in the final stages of the
decision-making process, the audience will be the commission members
themselves and their staffs.8 9 Each of those staff and commission
members has individual interests that must be addressed. Second, besides
these individual interests, the advocate must be aware of the interests
of the bureaucracy itself. Even though differences may exist between
the interests of particular staff and agency members, common interests
of the agency exist, and the bureaucracy itself must be considered an
audience. Finally, an advocate must consider intra-agency politics.
Within a particular agency, interests of staff and commission members
may differ radically, and in preparing her case, the lawyer must take
these conflicts into account.
1.

Individual Staff and Commission Members as the Audience

In a regulatory agency, there are usually three identifiable kinds of
commission employees and members: careerists, who identify their
careers and rewards with the agency; professionals, who receive rewards
in status from organized members of similar occupations elsewhere;
and politicians, who see themselves as having a future in elective or
appointive politics outside the agency.9 Obviously, the interests of each
of these kinds of persons are different. Although almost every agency
consists of all three types of individuals, an advocate must identify the
interests of the particular staff member or commissioner who comprises
the audience at a particular stage in a proceeding.
Careerists view their positions with the commission as occupational
commitments. 9' Because most commissions are not in danger of budget

88. See G. BEIuow & B. MOULTON, supra note 44, at 855-71 (distinction between appellate
court, trial court, and jury as audience for argument).
89. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 62 (describing three phases of regulatory process).
90. Wilson, supra note 68, at 374. Wilson's model is based on a review of different state
and federal regulatory agencies, including state public utility commissions.
91. Gormley's studies show that commissioners themselves usually do not join commissions
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cuts, few commission employees fear for their jobs or their salaries.
Their positions and career prospects with the commission may be
threatened, however, by a scandal or a crisis. 92 The interest of the
careerist then is to avoid such catastrophes. The maintenance of the
agency and their positions in it are the primary concerns of careerists. 9
Professionals, unlike careerists, are motivated by concerns outside
the agency.
[They] may hope to move on to better jobs elsewhere, but access
to those jobs depends on their display of professionally approved
behavior and technical competence. They may also be content to
remain in the agency, but they value the continued approval of
fellow professionals outside the agency, or the self-respect that
comes from behaving in accordance with internalized professional
norms. The maintenance of this professional esteem is of major
importance to these employees.9'

Professionals are likely to share a world view and a sense of the place
of their profession within it. They have common ways of perceiving
and structuring problems and of attacking and solving them; they often
share specialized techniques, skills, knowledge, and vocabulary. 9 The
degree to which a particular staff member or commissioner acts like a
professional, rather than a careerist, however, may depend upon the
extent of the rewards offered by other professionals outside of the
commission. 96
In public utility commissions, the key professional players are lawyers,
economists, engineers, and accountants.Y Generally, within the commission professionals, lawyers are particularly concerned with issues of

for career commitment. W. GoWLIEY, supra note 3, at 68 (Table 10) (most commissioners join
commissions because of the "interesting work" or a personal request from the appointer). On
the other hand, most staff members join commissions for career advancement. Id. at 69. Staff
members also stay at commissions longer than commissioners. Id. at 70.
92. Wilson, supra note 68, at 375.
93. Id. at 374. A good example of the careerist's attitude is the statement of the hearing
examiner in the California lifeline case, who was personally opposed to the lifeline concept: "I
was more or less the reporter when it came to what [the commissioners'] wishes were in explaining
and rationalizing the decision. They never asked my view and I didn't give it." D. ANDERsON,
supra note 3, at 161-62.
94. Wilson, supra note 68, at 374 (emphasis added).
95. Mosher, Professions in Public Service, 38 PuB. ADmnw. REv. 144, 147 (1978). Certainly,
not all professionals will view a problem the same way. A lawyer/politician, for example, may
approach an issue from a different perspective than a lawyer/practitioner. There are, however,
some common methods of problem-solving which most attorneys-whatever their type-will use.
96. Wilson, supra note 68, at 379.
97. W. GORMIEY, supra note 3, at 71 (Table 11); see also NARUC REPORT, supra note 2,
at 767 (Table 168) (commissioners' principal previous occupation or profession).
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98
procedural fairness and adherence to statutory and judicial authority;
economists are interested in issues of economic efficiency; 99 engineers
are concerned about technical efficiency in the production of energy
and reliability of service;10° and accountants are concerned with adher-

ence to generally accepted accounting standards. 0' Although on any
given particular issue a commissioner or staff member-whatever her
profession-may deviate from these professional norms, she is more
likely than not to view an issue, at least in the first instance, from the
perspective of her profession's world view. 0 2
The interplay of different commission professionals is well-illustrated
in Anderson's study of the adoption by the New York Public Service
Commission ("PSC") of marginal cost-based electric rates in the 1970s. 103
The principal force behind this decision was the chairman of the PSC,
Alfred E. Kahn, who, as an economist, strongly supported the use of
marginal cost principles to guide pricing decisions. 1° When Kahn was
appointed to the commission in July 1974, he faced a staff that had
to be convinced of the value of marginal cost-based rates. 05 He instituted a generic investigation on rate design and departed from the
traditional formal legal format of utility rate proceedings. Instead of
the usual courtroom style of witness examinations, he instituted a
"seminar" format, organizing witness panels composed of individuals
of divergent views. Attorneys asked questions to the panelists, and

98. See W. GoRaY, supra note 3, at 76-77, 80-81 (Table 13). Lawyers, for example, are
more likely to believe that citizens' groups should be reimbursed for the costs of their participation
in public utility commission proceedings and are more sympathetic to various underrepresented
interests, including consumers in general. Id. at 76. See generally Wollan, Lawyers in Government"The Most Serviceable Instruments of Authority", 38 Pun. ADMIN. REV. 105 (1978).
99. See, e.g., D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 90 (describing Alfred Kahn's approach to
regulation); cf. Stalon, Due Process for Regulated but Weak, Natural Monopolies, A.B.A. UTrL.
SEC. NEWSL., Jan. 1989, at 2 (economist and former state commissioner bemoans the negative
effect of procedural rules and government in Sunshine Laws on ability of regulators to assure
economic efficiency). See generally Rhoads, Economists and Policy Analysis, 38 PuB. ADMIN.
REV.

112 (1978).

100. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 100-01 (professional norms of engineers in New York
commission's marginal cost pricing proceeding). See generally Schott, The Professions and Government: Engineering as a Case in Point, 38 Pun. ADMrN. REV. 126 (1978).
101. See generally Morse, Professional Accountants in Government: Roles and Dilemmas, 38
Pu. ADMIN. REv. 120 (1978).
102. The importance of professional norms depends somewhat on the issue involved. See infra
notes 286-322 and accompanying text.
103. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 89-134; see Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 434, 453-54 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976) (decision adopting marginal cost
pricing principles). For a description of marginal cost pricing, see supra note 10.

104.

D.

105.

Id. at 96.

ANDERSON,

supra note 3, at 89-90.
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other participants were encouraged to interrupt examinations to ask
clarifying questions. °6 Although this format quite understandably was
opposed by some attorneys,1°7 Kahn maintained that he did not view
his role as that of a passive judge.'01
On substantive issues, Kahn faced opposition from staff engineers.
Because the engineers defined their goal as ensuring technical efficiency
for the production of electricity, they favored volume discounts for
large users to achieve economies of scale or to avoid excess capacity
by discouraging large users from going off the system and generating
their own electricity.' °9 While the engineers became convinced of the
efficacy of time-of-day rates, they still believed those rates should be
calculated with an embedded cost methodology." l0 Kahn eventually
persuaded PSC engineers to support marginal cost pricing by focusing
on their profession's norm that rates should be based on costs."'

106.
107.

Id.
108.

Id. at 98.
Id. Anderson describes the reaction of a group of industrial consumers to this format:
[They] filed a formal motion with the commission to recuse Kahn for his 'preconceived notions regarding the appropriate elements of rate design for electric service';
for having 'departed from his quasi-judicial role as a regulator'; for having 'indulged
in extensive cross-examination,' having made 'extensive extrajudicial comments on
the record,' and having 'clearly indicated impatience with views [he] considers
unacceptable'; and for having showed a 'propensity to inject testimony.'

Kahn responded to the attorneys' protests:
I have adjured all parties to look upon at least the theoretical phase of the proceedings
as an intellectual exercise, to treat it in the nature of a running seminar, in which
I have never
our purpose was essentially to explore certain academic ideas ....
pretended to play the role of a passive receiver of evidence.
Id. (emphasis omitted). In its order in the case, the commission itself responded to the objections
to format:
(Tihe contentions by some of the parties about denial of due process are totally
devoid of merit. While it might be questioned whether our examination of the
general issues of rate structure revision required evidentiary hearings at all, the fact
remains that the procedures adopted in this proceeding have been designed to ensure
the most searching examination of those issues, and all parties have had the broadest
latitude in the presentation and cross-examination of testimony.
Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 434, 447 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976).
109. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 100.
110. Id. at 100-01. Rates based on "embedded costs" are calculated using average historical
costs of the utility. C. PHMLIPS, supra note 13, at 388.
111. One of Kahn's economists on the staff noted:
One of the very appealing things [Kahn] used effectively over and over again in
dealing with engineers who had developed [their] ratemaking formula to precision
was the question: 'Do you want to be precisely wrong or approximately right?' One
of the problems, of course, was that they spoke a different language from us. But
he was successful [with the engineering staff), I think, because of the power of his
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Regardless of the type of professionals in a 'given public utility
commission, the degree of professionalism in the commission in and of
itself apparently affects the decision-making process. One study of
public utility commission professionalism" 2 found that the cost of
producing electricity is substantially more important in determining
price in commissions with higher professionalism than in commissions
with low professionalism.' 3 He found also that the higher the commission's professionalism, the more likely that the commission will be
responsive to efforts of consumer intervenors to hold down the price
of electricity."

4

Both these findings indicate that a more "professional" commissionwhatever the particular composition-is more likely to base its decisions
on objective standards and to be more open to information provided
by nonutility participants." 5
The third and final type of commission employee or member is the
politician. In the political arena, these "political entrepreneurs" seek
to develop reputations as advocates for certain interests with the hope
of securing future appointive or elective government positions."16 Except
for law, politics may be the most frequent former occupation of
commissioners. 117
The California Public Utilities Commission ("PUC") in its adoption
of lifeline rates is a good example of the efforts of political entrepre-

intellect and his continual appeal to the notion of getting price in line with costs.
supra note 3, at 101 (emphasis omitted).
As Anderson describes it, Kahn persuaded the engineers to accept marginal cost pricing principles
by showing how this methodology solved the "rate erosion" issue. That issue concerns the
situation in which increased sales do not provide enough increased revenue to avoid further rate
increases. The engineering staff began to perceive that revenue erosion occurred because of the
excessive demand in the tail block of utilities' declining block rate structures-one of the outgrowths
of embedded cost pricing methodology. Unlike embedded cost pricing, marginal cost pricing set
the rate for each block at the cost of providing service in that block. Id. at 101-02.
112. Berry, An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The Case of State Public
Utility Commissions, 28 AM. J. POL. Sci. 524, 544 (1984). Berry does not consider the particular
professional composition of commissions but instead looks at particular factors that would indicate
professionalism at a commission: the operating resources of the commission, method of selection
of commissioners, extent of job training for incoming staff, and degree of employee job protection.
Id.
113. Id. at 548-50.
114. Id. at 547.
115. Some commentators, however, have severely criticized the effect of professionalism on
commission decision-making. Bernstein, for example, argues that professionalism lessens the
opportunity for the administrative generalist to counterbalance the narrow views of the professional. M. BEroNSTn, supra note 40, at 118-25.
116. Wilson, supra note 68, at 374, 378-79; see D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 24-25.
117. B. MrrNICK, supra note 86, at 233, 236 (asserting that political considerations are
important in both elected and appointed commissions).
D.

ANDERSON,
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neurs."8s In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ronald Reagan's appointees
controlled the PUC and took a markedly pro-utility stance. 19 The
President of the Commission sought to reduce regulatory lag in the
ratemaking process by imposing strict procedural limitations on consumer groups and by reorganizing the staff.120 When these changes met
with uniform resistance from the staff, 2 ' the PUC attempted to bypass
the staff by relying on fuel adjustment clauses for rate increases. '" By
early 1974, rate increases in electricity and gas under these clauses were
coming almost monthly. At the same time, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company ("PG&E") sought a $223 million general rate increase-then
the largest increase in California history. 21 In response, community
groups began to organize for the adoption of lifeline rates.'2
Onto this stage in 1975 came Leonard Ross, newly-elected Governor
Brown's appointment to the PUC. Some of his acquaintances characterized him as politically ambitious and said that he aspired to be state
treasurer, and eventually a United States Senator. Ross made energy
rate structure reform and the "openness" of the process two of his
objectives. 125 Once on the commission, he quickly began to speak
publicly in favor of lifeline rates and openly lobbied the California
legislature for a bill enabling the PUC to adopt such rates. 26 Once the

118. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 135-65.
119. Id. at 138.
120. Id. at 140-41.
121. This is a good example of the importance of professional norms to professionals. Anderson
quotes one staff member as complaining, "[w]hen [the president of the Commission] started
screwing around with the ground rules all hell broke loose, and this brought us into disrepute."
Id. at 141.
122. Id. at 142-43. For a description of fuel adjustment clauses, see supra note 8.
123. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 143.
124. Id. at 144-56. For a discussion of the campaign for lifeline rates in California, see infra
text accompanying notes 189-94.
125. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 158.
126. The lifeline statute that the California legislature adopted reads, in relevant part:
(a) The commission shall designate a lifeline volume of gas and a lifeline quantity
of electricity which is necessary to supply the minimum energy needs of the average
residential user for the following end uses: space and water heating, lighting, cooking
and food refrigerating, provided that in estimating such volumes and quantities the
commission shall take into account differentials in energy needs between utility
customers whose residential energy needs are supplied by electricity and gas. The
commission shall also take into account differentials in energy needs caused by
geographic difference, by differences in severity of climate, and by season.
(b) The commission shall require that every electrical and gas corporation file a
schedule of rates and charges providing a lifeline rate. The lifeline rate shall not be
greater than the rates in effect on January 1, 1976. The commission shall authorize
no increase in the lifeline rate until the average system rate in cents per kilowatt-
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bill was passed, Ross successfully pushed for the approval of lifeline
rates in the PG&E case. While most of the PUC staff objected to the
concept of lifeline rates, the PUC basically ignored staff objections and
127
.sided with Ross.
Ross's tenure at the California PUC demonstrates that the political
entrepreneur excels in a particular kind of environment. Ross was
successful because his appointment came in a politically charged atmosphere (protests against large rate hikes) in which consumer activists
had proposed a clear alternative-lifeline rates.'2 He effectively used
the media to campaign for that alternative. As one of the lifeline
activists noted, Ross's style was "regulation by press release."' 29 The
PUC's task was simply to make a single choice between competing
values and, for a time, it could ignore its own staff's professional
assessment of rate structure issues.3 0 Commentators suggest, however,
that a political entrepreneur, such as Ross, can prevail over the commission staff for only a short while; eventually, the staff will become
so disillusioned with the politicization of the process that the maintenance of the agency itself may be placed in jeopardy. 3 '
Because of the different concerns of the various types of commissioners and staff members, an advocate in a public utility commission
case must fashion her argument differently, depending upon the type
of individual(s) she is trying to persuade. Because careerists are the
consummate bureaucrats, an advocate is not going to change their
position on an issue unless she can show them that the commission's
reputation will be severely damaged by their position and that the injury
may be attributed to them. Although public demonstrations and campaigns against a careerist may shake him up, not all issues lend
themselves to such tactics. Accordingly, in most instances, the best way
to persuade (or at least neutralize the effect of) a careerist is to show
that a proposal is consistent with past practices of the commission and
does not amount to a radical change in commission policy.3 2
hour or cents per therm increased 25% over the January 1, 1976 level.
Miller-Warren Energy Lifeline Act, ch. 110, 1975 Cal. Stat. 1010(3) (codified as CAL. Pun. Un.
CODE § 739(a)-(b) (West 1975)).
127. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 161-62. Anderson quotes the hearing examiner in the
case: "[W]hen you're a bureaucrat you do what the political appointees want." Id.at 162.
128. See id.at 168-69.
129. Id.at 162.
130. See id.at 176.
131. Id.at 177. In fact, Ross left the PUC after two years to become an undersecretary of
state. Id.
132. Creative legal arguments will usually not persuade a careerist. The advocate, therefore,
should frame legal arguments to these types of regulators in terms of common sense readings of
a statute or prior commission decision.
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When attempting to persuade a professional, the advocate should, if
possible, frame her argument in terms of the norms of that particular
individual's profession. 3 3 For the most part, a lawyer is going to be
concerned with statutory and case authority, an economist with eco-nomic efficiency, an engineer with issues of technical efficiency, and
an accountant with generally accepted accounting standards. 3 4 Although
legal arguments may be very important in preserving an issue for review,
an advocate is not going to win in the commission if she ignores the
policy issues important to the different commission professionals.' "3
In addressing the political entrepreneur, the primary focus should be
the politician's career or that of his patron, e.g., the Governor who
has appointed him or the commissioner to whom he is responsible. The
advocate should examine the "political market" in framing her argument, considering whether or not the particular issue can be used by
the politician to advance his career. Regardless of what position the
politician takes, the advocate must be aware of the kinds of compromises the politician might be willing to make to develop the largest
possible constituency.
For most issues, of course, the advocate's audience will consist of a
number of individuals. Either the decision-making will be a group
process, 36 or, before a final decision is rendered, issues will be considered on a number of levels of the commission hierarchy. Accordingly,
in most cases, the attorney must attempt to persuade more than one
type of regulator. As with appellate advocacy, the attorney must count

133. As DeLong has noted: "There is little point in arguing law to the economists, economics
to the scientists, and so on." DeLong, supra note 37, at 28.
134. Of course, professional perspective is not monolithic. An advocate should discovereither through examinations of prior decisions or discussions with others who have been advocates
before a particular individual-any experiences with the particular professional in regard to similar
issues.
135. Id. at 32. DeLong suggests that the best approach is to explain first why your position
makes sound policy and, only second, why and how the law not only allows but compels
acceptance of it. Id.
136. In an informal consumer complaint case, for example, the intake staff member at the
commission's consumer affairs division will collect information about the complaint and will then
probably consult with her supervisor. If the complaint is not routine, the supervisor may consult
more senior staff members or attorneys on the commission's legal staff. By the time a decision
is made on the complaint, four or five persons may have had input into the decision.
In a rulemaking or ratemaking case, the number of individuals involved in the decision-making
increases substantially. While a hearing examiner may consider the case in the first instance, she
may be assisted by staff assistants. The hearing examiner usually reports to the entire commission,
and the commission is advised by its staff assistants. Frequently, the commission will call upon
senior staff members or legal counsel for help in shaping the final order. At times, the commission
may even return the whole case to the hearing examiner for further hearings.
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her votes and frame her argument to persuade as many members of
the audience as possible.
From the start, in developing a theory of the case, the advocate for
a low-income group should identify those individuals in the commission
whom she wants to persuade and then fashion alternative arguments
directed to each of them. In urging special rate consideration for lowincome utility customers, for example, an argument based solely on the
"fundamental right" of citizens to utility service probably will not be
very successful with most lawyers or economists, 3 7 but it may be
effective with some political entrepreneurs. A stronger argument to an
attorney might be based on the commission's enabling legislation concerning protection of the public health and safety; 3 8 argument to an
economist might be grounded on the cost-effectiveness of such a program; argument to a careerist might be based on the serious challenge
to the commission's reputation if poor people are dying without utility
service. 3 9 The task for the advocate is to weave these arguments into
a cohesive theory from the very beginning of a case.
2.

The Bureaucracy as the Audience

Besides the interests of individual staff members and commissioners,
political scientists have identified what can be termed "bureaucratic
interests" in the regulatory process: fundamental concerns that infuse
most agency decision-making.' ° Although careerists are especially concerned about these interests, the other types of regulators also may take
them into account. All commissioners and staff members are part of
an ongoing group decision-making process, and over the long term the
interests of the group cannot be ignored. For this reason, the advocate

137. For arguments against "social-cost" theories of ratemaking, see J. BONBRIGHT, A.
DANIELsoN & D. KAMERSCHMN, PRINCIPLEs OF Puauc UTmrry RATEs 164-78 (2d ed. 1988)

[hereinafter J.

BONBuOHT].

138. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 8-101 (1987) ("Every public utility shall
...
provide and maintain . .. facilities as shall promote the safety, health, comfort and
convenience of its patrons .... ").
139. See In re Investigation into Long-Term Solutions Concerning Disconnection of Gas &
Elec. Serv. in Winter Emergencies, No. 83-303-GE-COI (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 23, 1983)
(adopting special low-income payment plan program in response to serious threat to poor persons
from lack of utility service).
The advocate should also identify which regulators are the "leaders" on the commission and
consider focusing their arguments on these commisgioners' concerns. Cf. Meier, supra note 87,
at 345-46 (reviewing general studies on the effect on policy of leadership qualities of individual
regulators). If there is a "friendly" commissioner on the commission, the advocate should consider
what arguments will help that commissioner persuade her colleagues.
140. See Wilson, supra note 68, at 377-78.
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in a public utility commission proceeding must be aware of these
14
interests in planning her case.'
The first of these.bureaucratic interests is risk aversion. As Wilson
writes:
Government agencies are more risk averse than imperialistic. They
prefer security to rapid growth, autonomy to competition, stability
to change ....
In short, agencies quickly learn what forces in their
environment are capable of using catastrophe or absurdity as effective political weapons, and they work hard to42minimize the chances
that they will be vulnerable to such attacks.
Although most public utility commissions are not likely to be totally
defunded, they still are subject to statutory limitations on their power,
legislative investigations, and attacks on their budgets. 43 To ward off
these risks, agencies attempt to avoid scandal and maintain sufficient
political support so that they can function effectively.' 44 This requires
agencies to appear as if they are balancing the interests of all the parties
45
before them, even if they are not.
As a consequence of this risk aversion instinct, agencies tend to
promulgate rules covering all possible contingencies.'"6 They then can
defend themselves from charges that they have ignored a particular
problem. At the same time, however, regulators are reluctant to engage
in serious long-term planning that might have substantial consequences

141. As with the description of the types of individual regulators, these descriptions of
bureaucratic interests are generalizations that are not always applicable but may be helpful in the
initial preparation of the case.
142. Wilson, supra note 68, at 376-77.
143. Many commissions in fact are not supported by general tax funds but by taxes and fees
specifically levied on utilities. See NARUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 807 (Table 176).
144. Berry, supra note 112, at 528-29. This survival instinct is the basis for Bernstein's capture
theory. See M. BEmRsTmn, supra note 40, at 155-56 ("Lacking effective and continuing political
support and faced with organized opposition of the parties in interest, a commission finds its
survival as a regulating body dependent heavily on its facility in reaching a modus operandi with
the regulated groups."); see also Anderson, supra note 1, at 16-17 (for most of the period of
regulation, utilities have been free to make virtually all the important decisions).
145. Empirical studies of public utility commissions support this view. See Wechsler & Backoff,
supra note 86, at 325 (study of Public Utilities Commission of Ohio shows that as a result of the
"energy crisis" in the early 1970s, the commission began to employ a regulatory strategy of
balancing the interests of the utilities and consumers; when negative consumer reaction did not
abate, the commission's "decisions retained a rhetorical commitment to the concept of balancing
competing interests" but produced pro-consumer results); cf. J. CImn, supra note 34, at 49-50
(in federal context, agencies seek support from various different constituencies). But see D.
WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 138-43 (elected Tennessee commission goes out of its
way to build consumer support).
146. Wilson, supra note 68, at 377.
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for one of their constituencies.' 7 In many of those situations, the
political stakes are just too high.
The second bureaucratic interest is legitimacy. Especially in states in
which commissioners are appointed, regulators seek expert legitimacy
to support their position as "independent commissioners."' Even in
states with elected commissions, however, regulators may want to give
the appearance of an objective basis to their decision-making.' 4 9 Regardless of the method of commissioner selection, to gain legitimacy
regulators need technical information-either from within the agency
itself or from participants in the process-on which to ground their
decision.'3 0
The final bureaucratic interest can be described as "commission
status" in relation to the commissions of other states. Studies of public
utility commissions have shown that commissions can be classified as
either leaders or followers.' 3 ' Some states, such as New York, Wisconsin,
and California, have commissions with large staffs and resources; they
are the first to try new innovations and procedures. 3 2 Other state
commissions prefer to wait and see how these new programs fare in
operation and how the courts in the leader states rule on their legality. 3 '
Although commission status as a leader or follower is difficult to
quantify, certainly the way that regulators view their agencies in comparison with other commissions affects their definition of the agency's
role and, consequently, the decision-making process.
The bureaucratic concerns of commission employees and members
have a number of implications for the advocate representing low-income
participants in commission proceedings. First, in planning a theory of
the case and developing strategy in the case, the attorney should Consider
the risk aversion interest of the agency. In some cases, this means
demonstrating to the commission that rejection of the advocate's po-

147. See Gormley, supra note 84, at 618; M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 177.
148. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 12.
149. See D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 110-11 (example of elected commissionTennessee Public Service Commission-that developed a systematic approach to evaluation of rate
proposals).
150. Cf. Friedman, Representation in Regulatory Decision Making: Scientific, Industrial, and
Consumer Inputs to the F.D.A., 38 PuB. ADMN. REv. 205, 210 (1978) (in FDA context, agency
staff members were unanimous in finding technical advisory committees important in providing
legitimacy to decision-making).
151. Joskow, supra note 2, at 324-25; Wilson, supra note 68, at 397 n.49.
152. See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 28, 34-36 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1974) (first state commission to implement rates based on estimated marginal

costs).
153.

Joskow, supra note 2, at 324-25; Wilson, supra note 68, at 397 n.49.
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sition will seriously affect the commission's mission. To persuade the
agency, an advocate must concentrate on the agency's problem, not
her own. She should try to show, for example, how a utility's proposed
rate increase or policy change damages the interests of the commission
itself, how it fails to promote the agency's mission, and how it inhibits
54
attainment of its goals and damages its purpose.
Accordingly, when arguing to a commission staff member against a
utility's inadequate notice practices before disconnections, an attorney
will want to emphasize not just the rights of the clients to service but
also the role of the commission, as a neutral arbiter, in safeguarding
procedural protections for all parties. Likewise, when proposing new
rate design methodologies to the commission, the focus should be on
-the benefits of the proposal for long-term regulatory stability in the
state, not solely the advantages to a particular class of customers.'"
And in those cases in which it is possible to bring legislative, executive,
or judicial pressure to bear on a commission's bureaucratic concerns,
such as funding, staffing, and legislative oversight, 5 6 the advocate's
threat to use these forces may be very effective in bringing, about
commission action. '57
Another method of addressing the risk aversion interest is to frame
a new proposal as a "balancing of interests." Research shows that
regulators attempt to accommodate as many interests as possible. 5 8
Accordingly, an advocate should attempt to show that the proposal
takes into account the interests of not only her client but also the
utilities and other ratepayers. For example, in proposing special rates
for low-income persons, the advocate might show that by keeping those
persons on the system and lowering uncollectibles, her proposal relieves
the utility and other ratepayers from the burdens of the present rate
structure. Moreover, the advocate should seek to build coalitions with
other groups on particular proposals-e.g., industrial, commercial, or

154. See DeLong, supra note 37, at 28.
155. Reflecting the bureaucratic interests of maintaining regulatory stability and appearing
legitimate, commissions have applied five criteria in evaluating proposed rate structures: economic
efficiency, effectiveness in yielding revenue requirement, lack of price discrimination, practicality,
and rate stability. See Environmental Impact Statement on Elec. Util. Tariffs, No. I-AC-10 at 47
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 1, 1977). See generally J. BONBIrGHT, supra note 137, at 382-84.
In preparing a rate design case, the advocate should attempt to develop arguments within this
framework.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 260-73.
157. In California, for example, lifeline proponents developed a multi-prong campaign for
adoption of lifeline: simultaneous pressure on the public utility, the commission, and the legislature.
See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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other consumer intervenors-to show the commission the widespread
political support for the change.5 9
The advocate should consider also the agency's interest in legitimacy.
Although rhetoric can be very useful in drumming up support for a
proposal and putting political pressure on a commission, most regulators
need a rationale for their decision-making. Regulators want and need
information to feel they are doing their job. 16 The advocate's role
should be to provide this needed information. In some circumstances,
the information can come from expert witnesses, company documents,
or cross-examination of company witnesses. In other cases, however,
the advocate for low-income intervenors can rely on her own clients.
To show abuse in the credit and collection department of a particular
utility, for example, the advocate can rely on complaints of clients who
have experienced problems. 161 To show the effect of the present rate
design on housing in low-income areas, the advocate can utilize community organizers in those neighborhoods.
Finally, an advocate must take into account whether or not she is
practicing in a "leader" or "follower" state. In a leader state, her
proposal can be presented to the commission as another example of
"cutting edge" regulation. In a follower state, in developing a theory
of the case, the attorney should look to the leader states for direction,
compile data on programs in those states, examine any court decisions
in regard to those programs, and, in any formal proceeding, bring in
expert witnesses who can testify about the operations of those pro162
grams.
3.

Interactions of Commission Personnel

Research on public utility commissions shows that the decisionmaking process is affected not only by the individual interests of
commissioners and staff and the bureaucratic interests of the agency
but also by the interaction of the different agency players. Within each

159. Cf. DeLong, supra note 37, at 31 (suggesting that for unpopular industry groups, the
best-solution is to "[flind other independent groups that have taken [a similar position]-academic
anfilysts, independent think-tanks, public interest groups, labor organizations, other agencies,
foreign governments-and emphasize that the agency should adopt the position of these groups").
160. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 12.
161. See D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 120-21 (complaint channel as mechanism
for expressing public concern about utilities).
162. Testimony of Marsha Ryan in South Austin Coalition Community Council, Petition for
Rulemaking, No. 84-0262 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n) (in Illinois proceeding for adoption of special
payment plan for the poor, Deputy Director of Ohio Consumers' Counsel testified concerning
similar plan in Ohio).
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commission, there is usually a chairperson, anywhere from two to eight
additional commissioners, staff department heads, senior staff members,
and lower-level staff employees. 63 The commission also may have an
executive director who oversees the operations of the staff.'6 Because
of this organizational hierarchy, commission decision-making, unlike
65
the judicial process, is fragmented both horizontally and vertically.
At each stage of a proceeding, several persons at each level will consider
the issues; by the time a final decision is rendered, the issue may have
been considered at a number of levels-from lower-level staff, to senior
staff, to the commission, and back to the staff.16 By the end of a case,
the formal hearing process may play only a very insignificant role in
67
the adoption of the order.
In this interactive process, commissioners regularly show great deference to their staff. The staff may be more influential than any outside
participant or even than any particular commissioner.' The reason for
this influence is fairly obvious: Staff members are a ready source of
data about the particular issue involved and of information about
complex issues that may be far outside the commissioners' own disciplines. 169

163. NARUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 758-61 (Table 166).
164. Id. at 779-98 (Table 173).
165. See DeLong, supra note 37, at 28. See generally M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 17273 (criticizing fragmented decision-making process because it is usually accompanied by splintered
management in commissions).
166. See supra note 136.
167. DeLong, supra note 37, at 29 (asserting that "the main function of a hearing will often
be to test information, not to unveil it"); see Leflar & Rogol, supra note 26, at 242. This
phenomenon is similar to the situation in the legislative setting in which testimony before committee
hearings usually plays a minor role in the legislative process. See J. BERRuY, supra note 19, at
223-24.
168. In Gormley's study of 12 state commissions, he found that staff is perceived as more
influential than any other outside participant. W. Go iw Y, supra note 3, at 138-40 (Table 23).
In nine of the twelve states, the survey participants perceived staff as having the greatest influence
of all the parties in public utility commission proceedings; in two of the states, staff was perceived
as having the most influence after the utility companies; and in one state, staff and the utilities
were both perceived as having the greatest influence. Id. In fact, in Welborn and Brown's study
of the Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee commissions, they found that the staff had greater
influence on commissioners than other commissioners. D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6,
at 86-88. They also found little influence of executive directors on the substantive work of the
staff; their major areas of responsibility were administrative: budgeting and personnel. Id. at 90.
169. As one commissioner told Gormley:
We make the decisions. However, we have a very large staff. The staff is rather
competent, and so the commission looks to the staff, particularly the senior staff,
quite heavily for information and opinions with respect to matters that come before
us. Since we have such a variety and large number of things which we can't always
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The studies also suggest, however, that conflicts regularly occur within
1 70
the commission's group decision-making process over both substantive
and internal organizational issues.' 7' As with any organization, power
struggles develop; the fragmented decision-making structure accentuates
these problems.
This research demonstrates that an advocate must view the audience
not only as a single individual, or one cohesive agency, but as a group
involved in an interactive process. While some generalizations can be
made about group dynamics within commissions, the most significant
implication of the research is that before planning any case an advocate
should investigate the workings of her particular commission to determine its internal politics. Key questions that should be considered are:
1) the relation of the chairperson to the other commissioners and
the commissioners to the executive director;
2) the identity of the senior staff members who wield the most
authority;
3) the role of the commission's legal counsel; and
4) the commissioners 72and staff members to whom others will defer
on particular issues.

Thus, when "counting votes" of individual commissioners and staff
members, the advocate should consider the impact of the internal
politics.
Moreover, the advocate needs to examine the relative power and
limitations of the commission players on each bureaucratic level. Obviously, a lower-level staff member is not going to be able unilaterally
to order a change in a utility's credit and collection practices. By the

investigate ourselves, we are very often . . . dependent on the staff.
W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 138, 140. Gormley, however, cautions against exaggerating the
influence of staff. He notes that staff members can be silenced by commissioners if they become
outspoken and suggests that the ability of the staff to influence commissioners may be diminished
if there are alternative suppliers of information. Id. at 140.
170. In his study of the California and New York commissions, Anderson found serious
conflicts between commission chairmen and senior staff. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 101 (in
New York marginal cost pricing proceeding, conflict existed between Kahn and engineering staff);
id. at 177 (in California lifeline proceedings, staff was bitter about Ross's "regulation by press
release style"); cf. DeLong, supra note 37, at 29 (asserting that in general, in regulatory process,
there are intra-agency conflicts).
171. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 139-42 (describing struggle in California commission
between commission president and staff in regard to plan to rotate staff members between
divisions).
172. Particular commissioners may serve on specialized committees of the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners or regional commissioner associations. In regard to issues
relevant to the work of those committees, other commissioners may defer to a commissioner
serving on one of those committees.
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same token, most commissioners will not, on their own, engage in an
investigation of alleged utility misconduct. Accordingly, the attorney
should fashion her argument to take into account the limitations of
that bureaucratic level. Additionally, as a general rule, the higher one
goes in the bureaucracy, the less time and attention the players will
give to the matter, and the advocate needs to adjust her arguments
accordingly. 73 The advocate constantly should be refashioning her
argument as she finds her way through the bureaucratic maze.
Research also shows the importance of attempting to work with the
staff. Because, on most issues, the advocate's initial contact with the
commission will be the staff, and because of commissioner deference
to the staff, an advocate should try in the first instance to persuade
key staff members. 74 Being aggressive without offending or insulting
the staff may pose a particular problem for the advocate of low-income
persons. Staff members usually have regular communications with utility
officials and employees and infrequent contacts with low-income groups.
Moreover, many low-level staff members are careerists who do not
want to "rock the boat." Accordingly, it may be quite difficult to
persuade a particular staff member to agree with an unknown group's
position. To neutralize the influence of such a staff member, it may
be necessary to attack his credibility or expert opinion. If the advocate
takes this approach, however, she has to deal with the problem of
commissioner deference. An astute advocate can use existing intraagency conflicts to her advantage, for example, by appealing to the
superior knowledge and understanding of a senior staff member or
commissioner. Antagonizing any particular staff member is dangerous,
but it may be the only way of overcoming intransigent staff.
Research further demonstrates the importance of making a written
record within the commission. In an informal credit and collection
complaint, for example, the advocate should memorialize her discussions
with commission staff and submit this writing to the commission. If
the advocate later files a formal complaint, a record exists, apart from
the staff's own version, as to the actions it has taken. Even in a small
case, a number of individuals within the commission will be involved
in the decision-making process. 75 Although oral presentations are im-

173. DeLong, supra note 37, at 29-30 (suggesting that an advocate broaden her presentation
as she goes up the bureaucratic ladder).
174. Indeed, DeLong recommends that an advocate in a regulatory agency should never insult
staff: "[Ain insulting approach actually makes it more difficult for superiors to reverse the staff
decision that has been the target of the comment. . . . [T]he major effect of the insult will be to
cause the agency to close ranks against you." Id. at 31.
175. See supra note 136.
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portant in that process, unless other agency members are aware of what
has occurred previously, the ultimate decision may be based on faulty
and incomplete information about a decision made on a different level
in the process. 76 An advocate, therefore, should create a "paper trail"
in the commission files throughout a proceeding.
Finally, an advocate should not stake her case solely on the formal
hearing stage of the proceedings. One of the problems with attorneys
in these proceedings is that they usually feel more at home in formal
evidentiary hearings than in informal negotiations outside the hearing
room. The research shows, however, that group decision-making entails
more than the review of an evidentiary record. The commission will
try to draft its written findings grounded on the record; that is the
legal requirement. But in most instances the interplay between commissioners, within the staff, and between the commissioners and the
staff, is the true basis for the decision underlying those findings. 7 7 The
attorney, therefore, cannot ignore the extra-hearing decision-making
processes; she must become a participant in them. She should, for
example, maintain regular contact with staff counsel, and, if ethically
allowed, along with staff witnesses, argue her position on the case.
Hearing recesses are excellent opportunities for such discussions. Further, the advocate should attend local or regional energy and utility
conferences or utility bar section meetings where commissioners and
the staff tend to gather. Although prohibitions on ex parte communications may bar discussions of issues in particular cases, these gatherings, which usually are frequented only by utility and industrial
representatives, give the advocate the opportunity to present alternative
views on general policy issues.
B.

The Client

The second factor the advocate should consider in planning a case
in a public utility commission is the ability of her client to pursue the

176. See DeLong, supra note 37, at 29. DeLong identifies two problems with reliance on oral
discussions with regulators. First, because the commission decision-making process is diffused,
the relevant decision-makers are seldom all in one place at the time of the decision. Second, most
government processes work slowly, and by the time of the final decision, decision-makers may
have forgotten oral presentations.
On the other hand, regulators must confront large mounds of paper each day. If an advocate
inundates a commission with documents-especially technical legal documents-the commission
and staff may ignore the papers.
177. Even in states with strict prohibitions of ex parte communications and rigorous sunshine
laws, staff has impact. If the staff cannot lobby commissioners behind closed doors, it can still
attempt to influence commissioners at open commission meetings.
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case effectively. This factor is the flip side of the composition of the
audience. A keen understanding of the personnel and internal dynamics
of a commission is useless unless the advocate's client can provide the
support needed to win the case before that particular commission.
Studies on commission decision-making demonstrate the importance of
considering both the power and limitations of the client in developing
an effective case.
Political science literature contains several significant findings in
regard to the effectiveness of consumer intervenors in public utility
commission proceedings. One finding is that groups are almost always
more influential than individual citizens in commission proceedings. 78
This is true not only because agencies are interested in averting risk
and responding to political pressure, 7 9 but also because groups have
greater ability to persist and follow through than do individuals. Organizations can stimulate awareness of common problems among their
members, increase levels of community participation, and help generate
a sense of collective purpose around which a program can be devel80
oped. 1
Research also has shown that groups are effective only if they can
perform three functions.' 8 ' First, they must be able to monitor the
agency's activities over a period of time. Regulation is an ongoing,
open-ended project, and groups must have the staying power for the
long haul.8 2 Research on staff resources for proxy and grassroots
advocates supports this proposition; those organizations with more fulltime staff who can monitor the activities of the commission are more
effective in commission proceedings than those with less staff support.
Proxy advocates spend more money, have more full-time staff, and
have greater technical expertise than grassroots groups.183 Not surpris178. W. GORMIEY, supra note 3, at 142-43. In his study of commissions in 12 states, Gormley
found that with the sole exception of Mississippi, where individual citizens communicated with
commissioners, groups have greater influence than individuals.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 142-47.
180. W. GoRl.Y, supra note 3, at 143 (quoting B. CHMCKOWAY & J. VAN TEL, CrzEN
PARTCPATION iN AmERICA 33-34 (1978)).
181. Sabatier, supra note 69, at 318-19.
182. Id. at 318.
183. See W. GoRmlEY, supra note 3, at 132-51; Gormley, supra note 18, at 449-56. For
definitions of grassroots and proxy advocates, see supra notes 18 and 20.
In his study, Gormley found that 64.3% of grassroots groups spend less than $25,000 a year
on utilities issues while all the proxy organizations spent more than $250,000 a year on such
issues. Gormley, supra note 18, at 450-51. In terms of staff, only 10.3% of the grassroots
organizations, compared to 100%o of the proxy advocates, had three or more full-time staff
members working on utility issues. Id. at 451. And in terms of technical expertise, only 44% of
the grassroots advocates had special training in utilities issues, compared to 85.70o of the proxy
advocates. Id.
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ingly, interviews with public utility commissioners and staff members,
grassroots advocates, proxy advocates, and utility executives suggest
4
that proxy advocates are more effectual than grassroots advocates.1
Second, to be effective, groups regularly must provide expert information to the agency to counterbalance the influence of the industry. 185
Again, data with regard to consumer group budget size and technical
expertise are consistent with this contention.' 8 6 Organizations that provide information are more influential not only because they provide
specific data to regulators for a particular decision, but also because
they establish a general reputation over a period of time in working
1 87
with regulators to resolve problems.
Finally, effective groups are able to mobilize their members periodically and form coalitions with other community groups to bring
political pressure to bear on the commission. 88 For example, the
consumer groups in the California lifeline campaign succeeded by
building a coalition involving senior citizen groups, labor unions, and
environmental organizations.' 89 Originally, the organizers wanted to stop
all rate hikes, but they decided on the lifeline alternative because they
felt that PG&E was more vulnerable to an issue framed as protection
of the poor and the elderly. 90
184. Gormley, supra note 18, at 452-56. In Gormley's study of 12 commissions, he found that
proxy advocates were judged highly influential in the process in three states; in one state they fell
between highly and moderately influential; in two states they were judged moderately influential.
Id. at 453-54 (Table 2). In six of the states, he did not identify any proxy advocates. Id. at 453.
For the grassroots advocates, the interviews disclosed moderate influence in six states and low
influence in six states. Id. at 454-55 (Table 2).
From this study, Gormley concluded that staff resources, budget, and technical expertise have
an important effect on the influence of consumer groups in commission proceedings. Id. at 45556; see also Gormley, supra note 33, at 459. There are some holes in Gormley's reasoning. First,
he does not control for the type of issue that is being litigated by the different kinds of consumer
advocates. Proxy advocates, for example, may chose politically easier issues upon which to
concentrate. See infra text accompanying notes 247-48. Second, his study is based upon a
reputational interviewing method, which depends for its reliability on the subjective judgment of
the participants. See W. GORmLEY, supra note 3, at 136.
His findings, however, appear intuitively sound. As a general proposition, the larger the
organization's resources, the greater the relative influence of the group.
185. Sabatier, supra note 69, at 318.
186. See supra note 184.
187. See Miller, State Administrator Perceptions of the Policy Influence of Other Actors: Is
Less Better? 47 PuB. ApnimN. REv. 239, 241-42 (1987) (study found that on the whole, state
administrators want more input from the public).
188. Sabatier, supra note 69, at 319.
189. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 151-53; Anderson, supra note 1, at 28. Although the
PG&E rate increases burdened the poor and those on fixed incomes the greatest, the coalition
chose to propose .a universal lifeline, see supra note 126, to expand its political base for the
campaign. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 151.
190. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 151.
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Having built the coalition, the leaders settled on three strategies: (1)
direct confrontation with PG&E (demonstrations at the utility's corporate headquarters); (2) direct action aimed at the Public Utilities
Commission (actions at rate hearings); and (3) lobbying in the legislature. 191 Concomitant with these actions, other -groups presented expert
testimony to the commission in support of rate relief for residential
customers. 192 These efforts resulted in the adoption by the California
legislature of a lifeline bill'93 and the eventual adoption of lifeline rates
by the California commission.'9
Once a group is victorious, continuing political presence is necessary,
not only to safeguard any gains that are won, but also to persuade
regulators of the group's determination.
The varying effectiveness of different groups in public utility commission proceedings has a number of implications for the advocate of
low-income intervenors. That budgetary and staff resources greatly
affect the ability of groups to influence regulators is not very astonishing
to advocates of the poor who already are very well aware of their
clients' financial limitations. The research, however, is helpful because
it also indicates specifically why these resources are important. Those
findings can help an advocate work with her client in developing a
strategy to overcome its limited abilities and resources.
1. Ability To Monitor Commission Activities
First, because of the long-term nature of the public utility regulatory
process, the advocate and -client must establish monitoring capability.
Participation in one rate case, for example, usually will not have much
effect for a low-income intervenor. The ratemaking process is fluidconsideration of issues in the present case will commence from where
the commission ended in the last case, and, by the time the final order
in the present case is rendered, some of those issues may still remain
for consideration in the next case or some collateral proceeding. At the
other extreme, intervention in every case relating to a particular utility
or to all utilities in a particular locale-telephone, gas, and electric-is
unrealistic. With limited resources, the advocate does not have the time
and ability to participate in each of those cases. Spread too thin, an

191. Id. at 153-55.
192. Id. at 151, 154.
193. See supra note 126.
194. In contrast to their counterparts in California, supporters of lifeline in New York were
unable to create a coalition of environmental, consumer, and labor groups. D. ANDERSON, supra
note 3, at 171.
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advocate and her client will have little effect except to see their names
on multiple service lists.
Early in her representation, the advocate and her client should
research and identify particular issues about which they are concerned
and select the utility or utilities upon which they are going to focus.
Taking into account the client's limited resources, they should develop
a long-term strategy (for three or four years), with specific goals
throughout that period. 19 Most intervenors are too reactive in the
commission process; they involve themselves in commission cases in
response to rate and other utility filings or commission-initiated rulemakings or generic proceedings.1 96 In contrast, as part of a long-term
plan, the advocate and client should consider affirmative actions that
can be brought to address the issues identified by the client.
Although some flexibility is necessary, the advocate and client should
participate in the commission process on only those issues that they
have identified. The client's staff should become thoroughly acquainted
with those issues, and the advocate and the client should not become
diverted by the latest utility issues as identified by the media or by
other consumer groups. The monitoring of commission work' 1 thus
should be limited to those issues that are part of the long-term strategy.
2.

Ability To Provide Expert Intervention

Limitation of issues also assists advocates in enlisting expert intervention. 198 With restricted resources, most low-income consumer groups
are unable to provide commissions with effective technical assistance.' 99
With a limited agenda, however, groups can give some expert advice
to commissions. On issues relevant to the low-income communitysuch as the effect of utility rates and credit and collection practices on
the poor and on low-income housing and neighborhoods-staff organizers and community leaders can provide important firsthand infor-

195. Examples of long-term goals are the adoption of particular rate design methodologies,
percentage of income payment plans for low-income customers (prohibiting utility disconnection
if the customer pays a certain percentage of her income for her utility service), or opposition to
special incentive rates for industrial customers.
196. See infra text accompanying note 334.
197. The advocate should get on the mailing list for commission releases, should regularly
check the state administrative register for proposed administrative action by the commission, and
should seek out friendly staff members who can keep her informed about important developments
on key issues.
198. See supra text accompanying 185-87.
199. See supra note 183.
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mation.10 Moreover, in developing the strategic plan, the advocate and
client should identify resources in the community that might provide
expert assistance, such as pro bono services of accountants, academics
with access to university computer facilities, and professionals at social
service agencies. 20" Although some of these individuals may not have
the extensive credentials of the utility's experts, they provide friendly
commissioners and staff with information that they can use to persuade
their colleagues. More importantly, they enhance the credibility of the
client. The organization is not just a bunch of protesters: It is a group
willing to make a serious effort over a period of time to confront an
issue.
3.

Ability To Mobilize Political Pressure

The final factor for the effectiveness of interest groups is the ability
to mobilize political pressure. An advocate without the backing of a
political constituency will make little headway in significant commission
proceedings. Individual clients are usually not going to be able to have
the perseverance or the votes to exert the same kind of political influence
as community groups. 2 Thus, the advocate should represent a group,
not just individuals.
For much the same reasons, the advocate should be representing her
client's identifiable interests in the commission proceeding. Commentators note the problems of legitimacy of representation in regulatory
proceedings. 203 Regulators are rightly skeptical of groups who appear
to have no constituency or attorneys who represent faceless clients.204
Leaving aside the serious ethical issues of litigating a case without

200. Even in contested cases, such testimony is probably admissible as expert opinion in
commission proceedings. See MODEL STATE ADMINIsTRATIvE PROCEDURE ACT § 10(1) (1961) ("In

contested cases ... [t]he rules of evidence as applied in civil cases shall be followed. When
necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible of proof under these rules, evidence not
admissible thereunder may be admitted (except where precluded by statute) if it is of a type
commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.").
201. Many community-wide social service agencies, for example, employ policy analysts who
study specific problems in the community (e.g., housing, neighborhood services, welfare benefits).
These individuals can be helpful in examining the effects of energy policy on the poor.
202. Employees of Legal Services Corporation recipients, however, are limited in their representation of community groups in administrative proceedings. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text.

203. Cupps, Emerging Problems of Citizen Participation, 37 PuB. Arm3N. Rsv. 478, 480-83
(1977); Stewart, supra note 21, at 1765-67; cf. J. BERRY, supra note 19, at 188, 194-95 (similar
problem in the area of public interest legislative lobbying).
204. This problem can be avoided in part by assuring that members of the community
organization-who are knowledgeable about the case-are present at all hearings and commission

meetings on the case.
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authority from the client, 2 5 the political effectiveness of an attorney
for an active and vocal group is much greater than that of an attorney
for some phantom organization with an unknown membership. Regulators need to know that a public interest or legal services lawyer is
not on some ideological crusade but represents concrete interests of a
constituency.
Moreover, the political impact on the commission is going to be far
greater if the issues addressed arise clearly from the individual interests
of the group's membership. For example, in a rate case, a low-income
group generally is more effective if it focuses on rate design issues
rather than technical engineering and accounting revenue requirement
issues. Although the commission knows that the group's members do
not comprehend all the intricacies of pricing methodology, it is still
possible for the commission to understand why an advocate is litigating
a rate design issue for that client. Further, it is more likely that a client
can devise a political strategy on that issue.
In the initial planning stages of a case, then, the advocate should
work with the client to develop a legal-political strategy. Because
effectiveness of a group is dependent in part on its ability to use
political pressure, the attorney and client cannot merely decide which
issues to pursue and leave it to the attorney to litigate the case.
Depending on the abilities of the group, it should devise its own strategy:
letter-writing, demonstrations, press conferences, coalition building,
lobbying legislators. Ideally, these actions will complement the litigation
process; for instance, at the time of the oral argument in the case, the
group can hold a demonstration; when an expert witness is being
presented, a press conference can be held. Most importantly, this
political pressure must be continued throughout the case. While commissioners and their staffs are accustomed to demonstrations at the
initial hearings, they are not accustomed to follow-through by intervenor
groups.
C.

Configuration of the Regulatory Environment

The third factor the advocate for low-income intervenors should
consider in planning her case is the regulatory environment in that

205. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrrY EC 7-7 (1980) ("[Tlhe authority to
make decisions is exclusively that of the client .... "); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.2(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of
representation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued.").
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particular state at that time. A commission does not operate in a
timeless vacuum. Policy analysis requires consideration of the temporal
development of "policy subsystems ' 20 6 within governmental institutions,
that is, actors from a variety of public and private organizations who
are actively concerned with a policy issue.3 Accordingly, a public
utility advocate should consider not only her audience and the abilities
and limitations of her client but also the regulatory environment in
which the commission and her client operate.
A number of environmental factors affect the regulatory process in
commissions. 208 These factors include regulatory history and political
culture, technological and economic context, and the other private and
governmental actors in the environment.
1. Regulatory History and Political Culture
Historical context and political culture are often crucial in commission
decision-making. The passage of lifeline rates in California and the
failure of lifeline in New York are good examples of the importance
of historical context. In California, in reaction to the "energy crisis"
of the early 1970s, Governor Reagan's Public Utilities Commission
fought to protect utilities from regulatory lag. In the process, it alienated
both its own staff and the public. By the time Governor Brown was
elected, the situation was ripe for "conflict maximization." ' 209 Because
of the public uproar, the regulators were freed from bureaucratic
restraints, and the battle became one between the interest groups and
the utilities. Leonard Ross, a political entrepreneur appointed by Brown,
was very successful in such an environment. 210
In New York on the other hand, after rate increases in the late 1960s,
Governor Rockefeller attempted to make the commission more professional. He took steps to strengthen the position of the commission
chairperson by naming Charles Swidler, former Chairman of the Federal

206. Sabatier, supra note 86, at 651-52. Sabatier asserts that "understanding the role of policy
analysis in public policymaking requires a time perspective of a decade or more." Id. at 651. The
history of the last two decades in public utility regulation bears out this assertion. See supra notes
1-20 and accompanying text.
207. Sabatier, supra note 86, at 651-52. Sabatier states that he wants to get away from
examining only the "iron triangles" of administrative agencies, legislative committees, and interest
groups at a single level of government and wants to survey actors participating in the policy
formulation process at various levels of government-for example, journalists and researchers.
Id.
208. See Wilson, supra note 68, at 383-84.
209. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 137-45. For a description of the conflict maximization
mode (entrepreneurial mode) of regulation, see id. at 23-25.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
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Power Commission, to fill the office. 21 1 Swidler made a number of
changes at the New York commission, including the introduction of
systems planning and the initiation of a fully-allocated cost study to be
used for setting utility rate designs.2 12 When Swidler left the commission
in 1974, he had developed a professional staff. 21 At that point, Alfred
Kahn became chairman and continued Swidler's efforts, eventually
persuading the staff and the commission to adopt marginal-cost based
pricing. 21 4 In this context, efforts for lifeline rates failed. 2"1
These opposite results may have been due in part to the different
historical context in New York and California. Although the New York
Commission before Kahn's appointment had public relations problems,
it did not appear to be as pro-business as the Reagan Public Utilities
Commission in California. For this reason, grassroots organizing was
more difficult in New York than in California, where the commission
became a "lightning rod for opposition from left liberal political
2 16
entrepreneurs" in the gubernatorial campaign.
"Political culture" also may be crucial in commission decisionmaking. At least one study shows that lifeline rates and bans on late
payment penalties are less likely to be adopted in states where political
elites tend to make decisions and more likely to be passed in states
with strong citizen participation. 21 7 On more complex issues, however,

211. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 93.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 96.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
215. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 170. In 1978, the New York commission entered an order
rejecting most proposals for lifeline, but approved an experimental program to study the efficacy
of a proposal to rebate to low-income customers excess utility revenue. In re Rate Design for
Elec. Corps., 26 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 280, 297-98 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1978).
216. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 170-71.
217. Gormley, Policy and Politics, supra note 86, at 96-99. Gormley concludes:
[T]he effects of political culture are greater when technical complexity is low. As
the need for expertise diminishes, the search for correct solutions recedes, the quest
for political acceptability proceeds, and underlying belief systems become more
important. Under these conditions, a 'moralistic' political culture encourages both
innovation and responsiveness.
Id. at 103.
In his study, Gormley uses Elazar's classification of states as moralistic (citizen participation is
considered a duty) or traditionalistic (political elites make decisions) to compare policy decisions
in different states. See D. ELAzAR, AMEeicA, FEDERALSM: A VtEw FROM THE STATES 114-22 (3d
ed. 1984). Besides the traditionalist and moralistic categories, Elazar has a third category:
individualistic political culture in which the democratic order is conceived as a marketplace and
the central focus is private concerns. Id. at 115-17.
Some examples of Elazar's categorization of states include: 1) traditionalistic: Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia; 2) moralistic: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Colorado;
3) individualistic: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, and Nevada. Id. at 135-36 (fig. '5.4).
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such as rate differentials between residential and industrial customers,
the study found less difference between the two kinds of states. 21 8
2. Economic and Technological Environment
The economic and technological environment also has a direct impact
on the regulatory process in public utility commissions. 2 9 For instance,
under the economic and technological environment in the 1960s and
early 1970s, utilities did not seek rate of return review, and regulatory
commissions sat by passively. From 1961 to 1968, there was almost no
regulatory activity nationally, and from 1958 to 1972, companies had
rather limited contacts with the formal regulatory process.
During
that period, electric companies experienced substantial scale economies
and technological improvements, and they were able to maintain or
reduce nominal average production costs.?'1 Gas company cost increases
were taken care of through purchased gas adjustment clauses."2
But events of the late 1960s and 1970s abruptly ended this tranquility.
In that period, inflation began to rise rapidly, energy shortages occurred,
and environmentalists became more vocal. In response to these events,
formal regulatory proceedings became more frequent. Rate of return
reviews became an almost continual occurrence, and, to deal with the
situation, commissions developed new techniques or refined old ones:
temporary rate increases, automatic fuel adjustment mechanisms, and
the use of the future test year in rate cases.2 3 Moreover, while previously
commissions usually had not focused on rate structure questions, leaving
this task to the utilities themselves, commissions now began to address
these issues.22
Examining these events, commentators have concluded that regulators
react to the economic and technological changes around them. 22 Utilities
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Gormley, Policy and Politics, supra note 86, at 100-02.
See generally Joskow, supra note 2.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 312.
Id.; see supra note 8.
Joskow, supra note 2, at 314-16; see supra note 8.
Joskow, supra note 2, at 317.
Id. at 298. Joskow states:
Contrary to the popular view, it does not appear that regulatory agencies have been
concerned with regulating rates of return per se. The primary concern of regulatory
commissions has been to keep nominal pricesfrom increasing.... Formalregulatory
action in the form of rate of return review is primarily triggered by firms attempting
to raise the level of their rates or to make major changes in the structure of their
rates.
This regulatory process is . . . extremely passive .... [I]t
is the firms themselves
which trigger a regulatory rate of return review.
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will not seek affirmative relief in the formal regulatory process unless
economic or technological change forces such action.
3.

Regulatory Community

The regulatory community-composed of other players, both private
and governmental-also has an impact on commission decision-making. 226 This community includes the utilities themselves, intervenor groups,
the media, and a whole array of governmental participants: other state
agencies, the governor, the attorney general, the legislature, the judiciary, and, at times, federal agencies. Despite this diversity, the community is a small group of parties focused on discrete sets of issues in
which their memberships are interested. 22 7 There are at least three
reasons for this phenomenon: the continuity of the individual actors in
the regulatory process, the ability of staff to become familiar with
representatives of-the utilities, and the small number and high visibility
228
of the principal actors in the process.
a.

Utilities

In terms of particular members of the community, one of the principal
participants, of course, is the utility. Studies show, however, that it is
impossible to generalize about the role of "the utilities" in the regulatory process. 229 Rather, the influence of utilities differs from regulatory
sector to regulatory sector 230 and, within each sector, from utility to
utility. 23' Nevertheless, on the whole, players in the process perceive
23 2
utilities as having more power than any other outside participant.

226. D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 54-61.
227. Id. at 61.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 69 (comparing the cooperative relationship between motor carriers and the
commissions studied with the more adversarial relationship between the commissions and gas,
electric, and communications utilities).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 69-70. Welborn and Brown found that smaller utilities had a more adversarial
relationship with the commissions studied than large utilities. This phenomenon may be the result
of the fact that larger utilities usually have more political muscle than smaller utilities. Also,
larger utilities usually can call upon more technical expertise in dealing with commissions than
can smaller companies. See Hagerman & Ratchford, supra note 86, at 53-54.
232. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 132-51. In Gormley's study of commissions in 12 states,
when asked to assess the influence of each type of participant, commissioners, staff members,
grassroots advocates, proxy advocates, and utility executives in nine out of the twelve states
perceived that utility companies were the most influential outside participants in commission
proceedings. Id. at 139 (Table 23).
As Gormley acknowledges, there are weaknesses in his methodology of relying on perceived
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This perceived influence may be attributed to a number of factors.
First, utilities control the timing of rate increases and thus determine
the "tempo of regulatory proceedings.

' 233

Second, utilities control the

flow of information to commissions. They are the participants that are
most intimately familiar with their operations. 234 Moreover, because of
the routine supervision of utility operations by commission staff, close
and informal ties develop between the utilities and staff. 25 Third, as
monopolies, utilities are difficult to evaluate on the basis of acceptable
performance standards, and a presumption of managerial efficiency
often exists. 236 Finally, most utilities have abundant money and person237
nel to devote to regulatory proceedings.
Research also shows, however, that even with this perceived power
(or perhaps more precisely, in order to maintain this power), utilities
seek conflict minimization. 238 Utilities generally attempt to 239reach mutually satisfactory accommodations with their commissions.
b.

Other Intervenors

Other intervenors in the regulatory process form a second set of
participants in the community. This group includes labor and environmental groups, sometimes stockholder groups, and, most significantly,
commercial intervenors, industrial intervenors, and proxy advocates.

levels of influence. See supra note 184. Gormley's concurrence study, however, supports his
findings of substantial utility influence in the regulatory process. In that study, Gormley examined
the concurrence between commissioners and other participants in the regulatory process on priorities
of regulatory issues and policy preferences. He found that in terms of issue priorities, commissioners agree with grassroots advocates more than utility executives, but in regard to policy
preferences they agree more with utility executives. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 129. In other
words, commissioners are likely to concur with grassroots advocates on the ranking of importance
of particular issues (e.g., sufficient energy supply, energy conservation), but are more likely to
agree with utility executives as to positions on those issues.
233. W. GORML.EY, supra note 3, at 140.
234. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 12; W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 140-41.
235. D. WELaORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 66.
236. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 141. In fact, this presumption has been formalized in
some jurisdictions into legal doctrine. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
133 Il1. App. 3d 435, 442, 478 N.E.2d 1369, 1375 (1985) ("Once a utility makes a showing of
the costs necessary to provide service under its proposed rates, it has established a prima facie
case, and the burden then shifts to others to show that the costs incurred by the utility are
unreasonable because of inefficiency or bad faith.").
237. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 141.
238. Welborn and Brown conclude in their study of three commissions, "[i]f a general
characterization may be applied to the quality of relationships between the commissions and the
regulated in [these commissions], it is that they are on the whole cooperative." D. WELBORN &
A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 68; see also Joskow, supra note 2, at 296-97.
239. D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 68.
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Although very little research has been conducted in regard to the role
of commercial and industrial intervenors, 24 0 the role of proxy advocates
has been examined.
Proxy advocates are governmental organizations that are empowered
to represent the interests of all consumers or a segment of. the consumer
class in a particular jurisdiction. 24 These advocates are governmental
employees who usually represent residential and small business interests
from outside the regulatory agency. 242 They influence commission proceedings, albeit on a narrow range of issues. 243 Not only are proxy
advocates perceived as powerful by other players, but states with such
advocates grant utilities smaller percentages of requested rate increases
than those without such advocates. 2" At least one commentator attrib2
utes this influence to the availability of resources to proxy advocates 4
for addressing highly complex regulatory issues. 2 "
Proxy advocates' effectiveness is limited, however, to a narrow band
of issues related to revenue requirements. 4 This may be because proxy
advocates are either required to representm or make the political choice
to represent different classes of utility consumers, from low-income
customers to small businesses. From a political perspective, proxy
advocates shy away from challenges to business groups because these
groups, and their chamber of commerce allies, often have influence
with key legislators who control the agency's budget. 249 Moreover, proxy
advocates generally are less influential in states with more experienced
2
commission staffs . 50

240. But see D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 122-23 (describing industrial intervenors' challenge
to marginal-cost pricing in New York commission).
241. See supra note 20.
242. W. GORMEY, supra note 3, at 135.
243. In Gormley's study of perceptions of influence, he found that in all six states in which
proxy advocates participated in commission proceedings, they were perceived as either moderately
influential or very influential. Id. at 139 (Table 23), 143-44.
244. Gormley, Policy and Politics, supra note 86, at 94; see also Mayer, supra note 31, at 17
(effect of proxy advocates on telephone rate increases).
245. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
246. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 163.
247. Gormley, supra note 33, at 459.
248. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 11-201 (1988) (Public Counsel is required
to promote and protect all Illinois citizens and classes of utility customers and users); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 78, § 15 (1988) (Office of People's Counsel represents residential and noncommercial
customers); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 774.010(2), 774.180(1) (1987) (Citizens Utility Board represents
rights of all natural persons over the age of 18).
249. Gormley, Policy and Politics, supra note 86, at 102.
250. Gormley, supra note 18, at 453.
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Other Governmental Bodies

The third group of actors in the regulatory community are governmental bodies: the Governor, the legislature, the judiciary, and other
state and federal agencies. Each of these bodies wields a varying degree
of influence in the public utility regulatory process.
In states with appointed commissions, the governor's primary power
is in the choice of commissioners. Because most state commissioners
have staggered terms, however, this power is limited; a governor can
"stack" a commission only over a period of time. 251 The studies also
show, moreover, that governors do not have much political incentive
to become involved in the.' regulatory process. 25 2 The political consequences of alienating an important constituency-whether the utilities,
industrial customers, or residential consumers-can be avoided by say2
ing, "[iut's in the hands of the independent commissioners.
This is not to say, however, that governors never become participants
in the public utility regulatory process, especially if the political stakes
(or benefits) are high enough. Both Governors Reagan and Brown, for
instance, used the appointment process in California to respond to
pressure from their political constituencies,2 4 and in Kentucky, rising
public and legislative concern over higher utility rates prompted guber255
natorial initiatives for reform.
A good recent example of gubernatorial intervention for high political
stakes is Governor Cuomo's intervention in the Shoreham nuclear plant
controversy. When he first ran for Governor in 1982, Mario Cuomo
took a classical gubernatorial position, refusing, to take a stand on
Shoreham, saying that a safety study should first be made. 2 6 But after
he took office, anti-Shoreham sentiment on Long Island began to soar.
In response, Governor Cuomo recognized the political stakes involved,
changed his position, and publicly opposed the plant. 257 His aides
challenged the' licensing of Shoreham in court; the new members he

251. W. GoRm.Ey, supra note 3, at 83.
252. Id. at 84.
253. Id. at 88 ("Public utility commissioners remain independent not because politicians respect
their integrity but because they recognize a political liability when they see one.").
254. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 138, 158.
255. D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 73-74. This is similar to the situation in the
federal system; the president becomes involved only when there has been a scandal or widespread
negative publicity. J. CEwB, supra note 34, at 52; see also Miller, supra note 187, at 242 (study
found that state agency heads wanted more gubernatorial influence in major policy decisions).
256. Schmalz, Plant Closing: A Key Cuomo Victory, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1988, at B3, col.
1 (city ed.).
257. Id.
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named to the Public Service Commission rejected rate increases for
Long Island Lighting Company ("LILCO"), and he pushed a bill
through the legislature, creating a public authority to take over the
pressure on LILCO,
public utility. 28 Continually putting public relations
25 9
he forced LILCO into a negotiated settlement.
Like governors, legislators usually attempt to avoid the political
liabilities of interference in the regulatory process. Theoretically, legislatures have a number of powers over commissions: budgetary review,
statutory change, and committee review. Studies, however, show very
little exercise of that power. Most commissions are funded by special
fees or charges on utilities and consequently are more independent of6
2
the legislature than other agencies supported by general revenue funds. 0
Legislators also are "more talk than action" when it comes to
statutory change and committee review. As one commentator observes,
"[p]oliticians are attracted by salience; repelled by complexity." 261 They
want to address issues that affect a large number of people in a
significant way and issues that raise factual questions not easily answered by lay persons. 262 Thus, when faced with a public utility issue
that is both highly complex and salient, legislators respond in two ways.
First, they introduce numerous bills to address the problem, which they
then allow to die. 263 This allows legislators publicly to act as if they
are addressing issues of concern but does not require them to tackle
seriously the highly complex issues involved. Second, they approve bills
providing for procedural changes in commission proceedings. 264 They
thus can appear to address the problem in a way that is understandable
to the public, but they do not have to confront the actual substantive
265
problem.

258. Id. ("Mr. Cuomo's position on a Shoreham agreement shifted over the last year-'a
dramatic change' in the words of Paul L. Gioia, whom Mr. Cuomo removed as head of the
Public Service Commission two years ago, in part because he believed Mr. Gioia was being too
favorable to utilities.").
259. Id.
260. W. GoRLEY, supra note 3, at 87; see supra note 143. Indeed, if consumer advocates
wanted to encourage more aggressive regulation, the best tactic would be to support an increase
in an agency's budget. See P. Qunuc, supra note 65, at 124 (FDA commissioner joked that if
agency needed a budget increase, all they needed to do was "screw something up").
261. Gormley, supra note 84, at 603. For a full description of the concepts of salience and
complexity, see infra notes 289-92 and accompanying text.
262. Gormley, supra note 84, at 598.
263. W. GoRM1EY, supra note 3, at 24, 86; Gormley, supra note 84, at 603.
264. Gormley, supra note 84, at 603, 613.
265. See Miller, supra note 187, at 242 (study shows regulators view legislators as having too
much influence on the regulatory process).
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Like governors, however, legislatures may be compelled to tackle
highly salient, complex issues when the political liability for ignoring
an issue is very high. Recently, for example, under pressure from antinuclear and consumer groups, legislatures have addressed the issue of
the application of the "used and useful" standard 266 for inclusion of
construction costs, especially nuclear plant costs, in a utility's rate
base. 267 This legislative activity, howeveir, usually has occurred only
after years of high rate increases, failed attempts by commissions to
address the problem, and intense lobbying by consumer groups. 268
Because of the incentives for the political branches of government
generally to refrain from interference in the regulatory process, the
judicial branch recently has become a more active participant in the
regulatory community. 269 Appeals of major utility rate cases increased
substantially from 1974 to 1979: from 28.6° 0 of the decisions in 1974,
to 46.4% of the decisions in 1979..70 Although no clear trend has
appeared in the reversal rate, commissions are more likely to be affirmed
than reversed,2 7 perhaps because reversal is more likely in highly
complex, rather than highly salient, cases.2 72 In a highly salient case,
there is usually more connection between legislative and administrative
substantive policy. On the other hand, as the legislature responds to
highly complex issues by imposing procedural constraints on the com2 73
mission, the judiciary sees its role as enforcing those restrictions.

266. Under the "used and useful" standard, a utility cannot include an asset in its rate base
for ratemaking purposes until it is actually in use and contributes to the process of making utility
service available. E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 10, at 112. With the lengthy time span
for construction of nuclear plants and with problems of cost overruns and plant cancellations,
issues have arisen in a number of states concerning the inclusion of all or part of construction
costs for these plants in rate base. See id. at 112-25.
267. See, e.g., CoN. GEN. STAT. § 16-19s (1988); IDAHO CODE § 61-502A (Supp. 1990); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 9-212 (Smith-Hurd 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-128 (1985); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 378:30a (1984); N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 66(24) (McKinney 1989); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 4909.15(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1989); 66 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1315 (Purdon
Supp. 1990); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 41(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
268. See, e.g., New York Used and Useful Act of 1986, ch. 518, 1986 N.Y. Laws 1170
(codified at N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 66(24) (McKinney 1989)). This Act was specifically aimed
at foreclosing the inclusion of the Shoreham nuclear plant in Long Island Lighting Co.'s rate
base. See Note, Lights Out for LILCO: A Look at New York's Takeover Plan, 53 BROOKLYN L.
Ray. 723, 735 (1987). A federal district court has found that the Act violates the equal protection
rights of the utility. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 425 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
269. Wilson, supra note 68, at 390.
270. W. GoRNMEY, supra note 3, at 94 (Table 15).
271. Id. at 95-96. Gormley also found that it was more likely that public utilities, rather than
consumer groups, will win. Id. at 96.
272. Gormley, supra note 84, at 604.
273. Id.
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The final governmental participants in the regulatory -process are
other state and federal agencies. These agencies may include state energy
offices, 274 attorneys general, energy assistance administrators, 275 and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 276 Very little research has been
conducted in regard to public utility commission relationships with these
other agencies. The one study that considered this issue concluded that
inter-agency relationships tend to be marked by "cautious cooperation"
and that in recent years agencies have moved toward increasing inter277
dependence.
4. Implications of the Regulatory Environment
The regulatory environment is significant in several ways to the
advocate in public utility commission proceedings. First, the advocate
needs to understand that certain aspects of this environment cannot be
changed. The commission history in dealing with certain kinds of issues,
the political culture of the state, and the technological and economic
environment are givens. All things being equal, the advocate for a lowincome payment program, for example, will have a more difficult time
in a state where a power elite traditionally makes regulatory decisions.
This does not mean that the advocate in such a state should advise her
client that all efforts to obtain such a program are futile; but she and
her client should understand the obstacles they will face.
The advocate therefore should thoroughly research the regulatory
environment in which she is operating. She should know the financial
condition of utilities in the commission's jurisdiction and any concerns
that the agency has recently expressed in that regard. 278 She also should
274. See NARUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 849-51 (Table 194).
275. Under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program, for example, the federal
government allots funds to the states for energy needs of the poor. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621-8629
(1988). This program is administered by a designated state agency and local administrative agencies.
Id. § 8624(b)(6).
276. See Kretschmer & Ballonoff, State Intervention at the FERC: Is it Worth the Cost, Risk
and Effort?, PuB. UTL. FORT., Oct. 27, 1988, at 17.
277. D. WELBORN & A. BROWN, supra note 6, at 71, 136. These researchers concluded:
The character of interaction in state program context is mixed. There are elements
of formalism, but more pronounced is informality and communication within a
framework of established personal familiarity and relationships. The quality of
interaction probably can be described best as marked by cautious cooperation....
[Blitter ongoing rivalries . . . do not seem to be present.
Id. at 71.
278. The advocate should acquire the commission's meeting agenda and obtain- copies of
orders that appear to be relevant to the issues on which she is working. She should also frequently
attend commission meetings to discover the general attitude of commissioners and senior staff
members in regard to particular utilities. Finally, the advocate should regularly read the business
section of local newspapers or local business magazines to learn what the utility public relations
people are saying to the media about the company.
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keep abreast of technological breakthroughs. 279 Further, she should
obtain copies of all recent commission decisions concerning a particular
utility and issue.3 Moreover, she should familiarize herself with any
legislative or executive efforts in the area and with the other state and
federal agencies that may be considering that issue. Finally, she should
research the extent of judicial deference to the commission in the
jurisdiction to determine the likelihood *ofjudicial review as a remedy.
With this information, the advocate should be able to gauge the limits
of advocacy in that particular commission on the specific issue of
interest to the client.
Beyond these efforts, however, there are methods for changing the
regulatory environment. The substantial influence of utilities in commission proceedings may be offset in several ways. One tactic is to
attempt to take the power of timing away from utilities. The advocate
should consider methods for seeking formal commission action before
a utility files for relief and for anticipating a utility's filing so she can
begin preparation of the case months' in advance. 1 A second method
is to counter vigorously the utility influence on staff. By focusing on
particular, narrow issues, an advocate' and her client may be able to
counterbalance the company's sway on those issues. 282 A third method
is to address the utility's interest in conflict minimization to reach a
negotiated resolution of a case. At times, a utility may consider agreeing
to a compromise on a particular low-income issue if it will get community groups "off its back."
Still another method for changing the environment is the building of
coalitions. Research shows proxy advocates can significantly influence
commission decision-making. Although such advocates usually address
very narrow issues that affect all ratepayers or all residential consumers,
if the lawyer and her client can persuade these advocates of the benefits
of a given proposal to all classes of customers, she can use their expert
resources in developing her own case. Some of the most significant
accomplishments in the area of low-income utility protections have
279. A good source for this information is the periodical, Putauc UrmirEs FORTNIGHTLY.
280. If the commission has its own official reporter, the advocate should, of course, keep
abreast of its recent decisions. If opinions are not published, the advocate should seek to have a
friendly staff member or proxy advocate provide her with opinions regarding utilities in her
client's jurisdiction.
281. In regard to rate structure issues, for example, the advocate should consider filing a
complaint case against the utility alleging that certain aspects of a utility's rate design violate
statutory requirements. In this way, an advocate may be able to maintain more control over the
case than in a full-blown rate case brought by the utility. The "downside" of such an approach,
however, is that a complainant assumes the burden of proof in a case.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96.
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28 3
come from joint efforts of low-income and proxy advocate groups.
The final implication of research on regulatory environment is the
limitation of using other branches of government to influence the
commission. Unless the issue is in the public eye-or the client can
politicize the issue 28-and a strong political coalition can be developed,
the legislature and executive branches probably will do nothing more
than propose legislation that will go nowhere; the governor or the bill's
sponsor will have a press conference, but the bill will die in committee.
Studies indicate that the most profitable use of legislative pressure is
to develop legislative reform in the areas of procedural fairness. If the
commission does not abide by these procedural requirements, the advocate has a basis for judicial review in an area in which the courts
are likely to intervene. 28 5 The advocate can at least temporarily delay a
negative commission ruling, whether or not she substantially affects the
ultimate decision.

D. The Issues
Up to this point, I have focused on the effect of various types of
political factors-the composition of the commission and its staff, the
identity of the client, and the regulatory environment-on commission
decision-making in regard to particular issues. Issues themselves, however, can determine politics. 286 In other words, commission decisionmaking-and the concomitant political process-may vary depending
upon the type of issue before the commission. 287 Accordingly, in developing a theory of the case, the advocate should consider the effect
of the particular issues involved on her ability to persuade the commission.
288
1. Salience and Complexity of Issues
Different issue patterns faced by regulatory bodies set different
political mechanisms into gear depending on an issue's salience and

283. The Illinois Energy Assistance Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 1301-08 (SmithHurd 1988 & Supp. 1990), was passed after extensive advocacy efforts of a coalition composed
of grassroots advocates, proxy advocates, and social service organizations. See Record in South
Austin Coalition Community Council, -Petition for Rulemaking No. 84-0262 (Ill. Commerce
Comm'n).
284. See infra text accompanying notes 286-322.
285. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 117 Ill. 2d 120, 136-41
510 N.E.2d 865, 872-74 (1987) (reversing a rate order based on the misinterpretation of a statute
adopted at the behest of consumer groups and modifying the burden of proof requirement for
inclusion of new electric utility generating plant in rate base).
286. W. GotMIEY, supra note 3, at 152.
287. Id. at 152-53; see D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 19-20 (regulatory politics depends on
the task that the commission is facing).
288. I have based this description of the type of regulatory issues on William Gormley's model
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complexity. A highly salient issue is one that significantly affects a
large number of people. As a result, the scope of conflict over a salient
issue is broad, and the intensity of the conflict is great. 2 9 Regulation
may be salient, for example, when a necessity is imperiled, when there
is a threat to the American dream, when the issue concerns working
conditions and terms of employment, and when there is a challenge to
29
community values .

Highly complex issues, on the other hand, are those that raise factual
questions that cannot be answered by. a generalist or a lay person.2 9'
Regulatory issues generally are more technically complex when they
concern regulation of a monopoly rather than competitive firms, larger
rather than smaller firms, emerging technology rather than an estab292
lished one, and the regulation of products rather than people.
Both within and outside the agency, the players and their tactics
change-and consequently the brand of politics changes-depending on
the salience and complexity of the issue being considered. 293 Different

for describing different issue patterns faced by regulatory bodies and the kind of politics associated
with each pattern. See generally Gormley, supra note 84. For the research on public utility
commissions underlying this study, see W. Goxiei Y, supra note 3, at 152-77.
289. Gormley, supra note 84, at 598.
290. Id. at 600-01. Gormley asserts that energy, environment, employment, health, safety, and
quality of life issues are salient, while transportation, commerce, finance, and communication
issues have low salience. Id. Of course, salience of a particular issue will change over a period
of time. For example, energy only became a salient issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See
supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
291. Gormley, supra note 84, at 598.
An economic regulatory issue may be highly salient to a given regulated industry
but not to the general public. If so, it is low in public salience. An intergovernmental
regulatory issue may be complex from an administrative standpoint but not from a
technical perspective. If so, it is low in technical complexity.
Id. at 598-99.
292. Id. at 601-02. Gormley contends that environmental, energy, transportation, and finance
issues tend to be high in complexity while employment, consumer protection, commerce, and
housing issues tend to be low in complexity. "Health and communications issues vary." Id. at
602.
293. Id. at 603.
In regulatory politics, as in baseball, there are "regular" and "irregular" participants.
Visit a ballpark and you will see all of the regulars, barring injuries, of course. But
you will see the irregulars-those in the bullpen and those on the bench-only on
special occasions (close games, important games, extra-inning games, etc.). Visit a
regulatory proceeding and you can count on seeing bureaucrats and regulated industry
officials. These are the regulars. The irregulars-politicians, citizens, journalists,
judges, professionals-participate only under certain circumstances. In regulatory
politics, as in baseball, the participants vary from game to game. The big difference
between regulatory politics and baseball is that, in regulatory politics, the irregulars
are usually more interesting to watch.
Id. at 602-03.
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combinations of salience and complexity can result in at least four
different arenas of regulatory politics: hearing room, board room,
street-level, and operating room. 294
These four categories are quite helpful in examining the impact of
the issue on public utility commission decision-making. "Hearing room"
politics are most likely when the issues are highly salient but not very
complex. 295 These issues have broad public significance but are not
perceived to be highly technical. As a result, citizens have the incentive
to mobilize and participate in the decision-making process, 29 journalists
are attracted to the controversy, 297 and politicians may want to get into
the fray. 298 On the other hand, because the public perceives the issue
as significant and relatively simple, the regulated companies, business
groups, and staff bureaucrats may not wield much influence in hearing
299
room politics.
In the public utilities area, grassroots advocates can very effectively
influence hearing room politics." In the California lifeline battle, for
example, the supporters of lifeline framed their campaign to make the
issue highly salient. 30 1 To build popular support, the lifeline coalition
chose to fight for a universal lifeline plan that would apply to all
30 2
residential consumers rather than to the special needs of the poor.
To deflect the argument that lifeline was an income redistribution
measure, pro-lifeline commissioners defined the issue as protection of
"a basic human right." 303 To make the issue more salient, the coalition
demonstrated at the commission and utility headquarters to gain wide

294. Id. at 606-15.
295. Id. at 608.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 604.
298. Id. at 603. Politicians, however, usually make news with introduction of bills, not with
on-going scrutiny of the regulatory process. See supra text accompanying notes 251-68. Gormley
contends that the pathology of hearing room politics is that the hearing room becomes ripe for
demagoguery "with an amazing amount of mudslinging, vilification and hyperbole." Gormley,
supra note 84, at 617.
299. Gormley, supra note 84, at 604-05.
300. In addition to Anderson's study of lifeline in California, see also W. GosulsY, supra
note 3, at 165 (Table 28) (more grassroots activity, more chance of adoption of lifeline rates);
Berry, supra note 49, at 275 (the greater the salience of regulatory policy to the "have-not"
consumer, the less the degree of commission capture by the industry).
301. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 171. Anderson notes that both the California commission
and PG&E had their headquarters in San Francisco, the media center of northern California and
the home of many of the poor and elderly who composed the lifeline coalition. This made it very
easy to develop lifeline into a salient issue. In New York, on the other hand, the commission was
located in Albany, which probably insulated it from intense consumer activity.
302. Id. at 151.
303. Anderson, supra note 1, at 30.
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media attention and called upon the legislature for support of the
program. 304 Consistent with the approach that the issue was a simple
one of basic human rights, the major participants in the coalition also
30 5
rejected the strategy of intervention in any technical rate hearings.
Because the issue was framed as salient and noncomplex, the California commission was faced with intense public and legislative pressure
and adopted lifeline rates. This was a "point decision"; as framed by
its proponents, it was an unambiguous policy decision with significant
public impact that only could be voted up or down. 306 If, however, the
issue had developed as a technical problem requiring detailed expert
analysis, it is unclear whether lifeline would have passed.3 07 The issue
could have been deferred to the staff, thereby leaving the realm of
hearing room politics and entering the domain of board room politics.
"Board room" political issues are technically complex and not very
salient. 308 In these situations, policy-making is usually in the hands of
high-level bureaucrats and professionals in the agency and the regulated
companies. 30 9 As a result, board room politics resemble the model of
3 10
regulation described by the capture theorists.
The percentage of a utility company's rate hike request actually
granted by the commission usually is decided in the context of board
room politics. 31. Although particular rate base or expense items occasionally will draw the public's attention in a rate case,312 usually specific
accounting and finance issues concerning a utility's revenue requirement
are left to utility representatives, commission staff, and the commissioners themselves.31 3 While proxy advocates have influence on these
kinds of issues, grassroots advocates, with limited resources to tackle
the technical questions involved, are not very successful. 314

304. D. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 154-56.
305. Id. at 154.
306. See id. at 169.
307. Id. at 169-70.
308. Gormley, supra note 84, at 606.
309. Id. at 606-08.
310. Id.at 616.
311. W. GORM.EY, supra note 3, at 162; see Gormley, Policy and Politics, supra note 86, at
94.
312. An example of such an issue is the inclusion of new nuclear plants in rate base.
313. W. GoMwIay, supra note 3, at 162.
314. Id. at 162-63 (Table 27). In fact, Gormley found a positive correlation between grassroots
advocacy and rate hikes. Id. He conjectures that this could be the result of his inclusion of
environmentalists in the category of grassroots advocates. Id. at 164. Environmentalists often will
not fight rate hikes if increases will result in a halt in the excessive consumption of energy. Id.
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The third type of politics, "street-level" politics, concerns issues that
have both low salience and low complexity.3" 5 In this context, there is
little pressure for either accountability or expertise. 31 6 Utility commission
regulations concerning late payment charges on bills are a good example
of policies decided by street-level politics. 3 7 Other illustrations are the
day-to-day auditing and inspection of utility operations by commission
*staff, routine approvals of issuances of utility securities, and individual
consumer complaint proceedings against utilities. In all of these proceedings, the decisions are generally made by low-level bureaucrats
(staff members or hearing examiners), and the policy-making process
318
is usually nothing more than a series of ad hoc decisions.
Finally, "operating room" politics occur when issues are both salient
and complex. 3 9 In this situation, the agency is under pressure both to
be accountable to the public and to render an expert decision that is
technically and legally sound. These are the issues ultimately left to the
3 20
upper-level bureaucrats and the commissioners themselves.
Studies of public utility commissions indicate that grassroots advocates are not very successful in the operating room arena. Grassroots,
as well as proxy advocates, for example, often have negligible impact
on the allocation of costs between industrial and consumer customers
in rate cases. 32' The large resources of other parties significantly inflate
their influence. The adoption of marginal cost pricing in New York is
a good illustration of how the chairman of a commission can take
charge of a highly salient and complex case and win over his staff in
3 22
almost complete disregard of powerful intervenor groups.
2.

Time Dimension of Regulatory Issues

Besides different types of issue areas, there is also a significant
difference between regulatory issues and traditional trial advocacy issues. In a trial, the finder of fact usually examines issues of historic

315. Gormley, supra note 84, at 610.
316. See id. at 610, 617.
317. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 166-67; Gormley, Policy and Politics, supra note 86, at
98 (grassroots advocates are successful in obtaining bans on late payment charges).
318. Gormley, supra note 84, at 610, 617.
319. Id. at 611.
320. Id. at 613-14.
321. W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 169. One commissioner told him, "[a]il they know is the
end result. They don't know how to get there." Id. Grassroots advocates with resources (e.g.,
the Environmental Defense Fund), however, have had some success with highly complex issues.
Id. at 173.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
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fact to render a final decision that defines with some certainty the
relative rights of the parties. Decisions in the regulatory context, however, are much more amorphous. 23 Regulators are not as much concerned with historic fact and determinations of specific rights as they
are with forecasts of the future. 324 By their very nature, such predictions
are uncertain.3 25 Regulation is an ongoing process, and regulators consider any decision to be subject to reexamination and further consideration. 326 Thus, even winning and losing may be "ambiguous concepts
' 3 27
in policy advocacy.
3.

Implications of Issue Context

The type of issue involved in public utility commission proceedings
is highly significant for the advocate of low-income intervenors. First,
the advocate should recognize the importance of issue type in developing
her case. The particular kind of issue in question can affect the politics
of the proceedings as much as the political environment can influence
the policy determination on an issue. If an issue, for example, is
perceived as highly complex with low salience, board room politics will
probably prevail, and the advocate must decide whether or not she can
become a serious participant in the discussions on the technical issues
involved.
Second, and more importantly, the studies show the importance of
perception of issue type on the politics of the proceeding. In other
words, the salience and complexity of an issue area are not fixed in
stone and can be changed, within limits, by the advocate. 328 Also, the
advocate and her client may be able to redefine a high complexity/low
salience issue and mobilize the public to take the issue out of the board
room and bring it into the hearing room. Lifeline rate decisions, for
example, are not per se salient issues. The issue can be considered
welfare legislation in disguise, merely addressing the interests of the
poor. An advocate, however, following the tactics of the lifeline campaign in California, can frame the issue as significant for the whole
consuming public (utility service as a "basic human right" for all
consumers) rather than as a subsidy for the poor (regulation as income
redistribution). The issue then may be perceived as salient.

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

DeLong, supra note 37, at 33-35.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.; see Sabatier, supra note 86, at 650.
DeLong, supra note 37, at 36.
W. GORMLEY, supra note 3, at 170; Gormley, supra note 84, at 599.
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Although perception of the complexity of an issue is less malleable
than its salience, it too can be changed.3 29 New technology, for example,
can create new policy options; 330 changes in competition can change the
need for certain kinds of regulation.3"3' Moreover, highly political issues
are too often defined as technical so that regulators can avoid making
difficult political choices.3 32 Even if an advocate cannot point to changes
in technology or competitive environment, she can attempt 'to demonstrate that the "emperor has no clothes"-that what is perceived as a
highly complex issue is in fact nothing but a very ambiguous political
choice. Rate of return methodology, for example, can either be considered a highly complex finance issue or a hocus pocus process. 333 The
advocate's goal then can be to demystify the technical complexity of a
particular issue.
Third, highly salient/highly complex operating room politics present
serious problems for grassroots advocates. In large rate cases, for
example, the stakes both for the utility and large industrial customers
are so high, and the principal issues may be so complex, that grassroots
advocates are very likely to get lost. Even with moderate resources,
their case may very well be overshadowed by the political power and
expert resources of their opponents. In a case concerning the inclusion
of a nuclear plant in a rate base, for example, the commissioners may
consider rate design issues as insignificant and defer the decision on
that part of the case to low-level bureaucrats. A low-income group
focusing on rate design may become a forgotten party in the proceeding.
Accordingly, depending on the particular issue involved, an advocate
for low-income clients might want to consider alternatives to intervention. She may want to contemplate the possibility of a complaint or
investigation case against the utility in which to address a particular
issue. Or, if an issue is applicable to a number of utilities, she may

329. Gormley, supra note 84, at 599.
330. Id. Changes in metering technology, for example, can greatly affect such issues as timeof-day rates or estimated billing. See Duda, The Evolution of Automatic Meter Reading, Pua.
Urn. FORT., June 23, 1988, at 20, 21.
331. Gormley, supra note 84, at 599. "Wheeling" of electricity, for example, can substantially
affect electricity rates. See, e.g., Rosso, Transmission Access-A Crucial Issue for an Industry,
PuB. UT. FORT., February 16, 1989, at 18.
332. Nelkin & Pollak, supra note 39, at 64 ("Recent disputes have taught us a lesson-that
decisions about risk are not simply matters of sufficient technical evidence or adequate information.
Substantive issues are at stake which embody highly controversial political and social values.
Thus, the resolution of conflict is not always possible, and seeking consensus [on technical issues]
...
is hardly a feasible goal.").
333. See generally Joskow, supra note 2.

700

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

want to petition for a rulemaking.3 3 4 At least in those cases, the advocate
can control the timing of the case, can attempt to control the issues
that are considered, and can try to narrow the focus of the inquiry.
Finally, the research on issue type shows how the advocate may be
able to use the uncertainty of the regulatory process to her benefit in
litigating a case.335 Commissioners have broad discretion to reexamine
or reopen issues,33 6 and often they will render a decision that leaves an
issue open for consideration in the next rate case or other future
proceeding.337 Although this option is often used for the benefit of
utilities,33 it can also be applied for the benefit of low-income intervenors. The advocate for such groups can propose, for example, a
sunset provision for a low-income payment plan or a pilot program for
rate relief.33 9 By focusing on the experimental nature of such projects,
the advocate can give the regulator an option that is both reasonable 340
and consistent with the commissioners' view of the uncertain nature of
regulation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The goal of any advocate is to persuade a decision-maker. While in
the trial advocacy context, the lawyer's task is to maximize the credi334.

MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

§ 6 (1961) ("Any interested person may

petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.").
335. Public utility regulation is an ongoing process. See supra text accompanying note 182.
336. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 10-113 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-80
(1989).
337. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co., 71 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 81, 123 (IUI.
Commerce Comm'n 1985) (deferring to next rate case issue of methodology for calculating
marginal customer costs); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 86 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 394,
435 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1987) (directing staff and company to address in next rate case
issue of proper allocation of utility's production plant between energy and demand costs); Brooklyn
Union Gas, 39 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 388, 421-22 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980) (ordering
utility to consider in its next rate case "seasonal rate differentials in light of the marginal cost of
serving different customers at different times of the year"); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 34 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 224, 251 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1979) (deferring to next rate case the
issue whether or not directory assistance service should receive increases in rates); Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., 65 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 151, 159-60 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1985) (directing
utility in its next rate case to revise its calculation of labor rates for extension of service and
other customer requested work).
338. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co., 71 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 121-23 (acknowledging validity of low-income intervenor's analysis of customer charge issue but deferring issue
to next case).
339. See, e.g., American Hoechest Corp. v. Department of Pub. Util., 379 Mass. 408, 399
N.E.2d 1, 4 (1980) (affirming commission order instituting experimental special rate for elderly
poor).
340. Commentators note the importance of a positive, rather than negative, strategy. See D.
ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 110-12 (decision of Environmental Defense Fund rejecting position
of always intervening from a purely negative stance-just attacking the building of plants).
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bility of her evidence, 34' the challenge to an advocate in a public utility
commission proceeding is somewhat different. An attorney can present
a highly credible expert and a sound technical theory of the case but
still lose. As the political science studies show, regulatory decisionmaking is a highly political process. Far too often lawyers-especially
representatives of consumer intervenors-believe that if they are able
to retain an expert witness with a credible theory, the agency will
automatically buy their case or at least seriously consider it. The research
on commission decision-making demonstrates, however, that presentation of a sound technical case is only a small part of an advocate's
job.
The overall goal of an advocate in a public utility commission
proceeding should be to consider the relevant factors that affect commission decision-making-the nature of the audience, the particular
client, the regulatory environment and issue context-and to develop a
persuasive political story for the commission. After examining each of
the four factors, the advocate should develop a strategy that addresses
the various political interests involved in the case. "[P]olitical action is
often dominantly about ... the creation of communities, shared references, commonsensical stories that help shape and order an amorphous
world. ' 342 In addressing most commissions and their staffs, the task is
not to win over a captured agency whose members decide issues solely
based on their own self-interests, nor is the aim to present a technically
perfect economic, finance, or legal theory. Rather, the goal should be
the presentation of a story that, in the political context of a particular
commission, helps the commission make sense of the "amorphous
world" of public utility regulation.

341. P. BERGMAN, supra note 44, at 3.
342. Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"
Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 270 (1988).

